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Abstract 
 
“National ideals or National Interest?” examines the making and implementation by 
successive New Zealand governments of policy toward apartheid South Africa from 
1981 to 1994. Its main focus is the contradictory relationship between living up to 
New Zealand’s ideals against doing what was practicable in the context of the time.  
The dilemma the apartheid state faced, in trying to solve its internal 
problems while not imperilling its external security was often not appreciated by 
the New Zealand government. These misconceptions helped shape New Zealand 
policy. Ironically once the South African regime began to investigate the 
possibilities of some sort of political transformation, their New Zealand 
counterparts were less willing to empathise with the risks involved with such an 
undertaking than they had been in the 1960s and 1970s.  
“National Ideals’ also examines the role of civil society and what was often 
a parallel unofficial foreign policy based around these person -to - person contacts, 
including the problems posed for the government by the need to persuade groups 
such as the NZRFU to follow government policy without overstepping what were 
strongly entrenched principles of individual freedom. The conflicts within the two 
main political parties of New Zealand were also important in shaping policy, as was 
the adversarial relationship between the major parties.   
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“National Ideals” concluded that more often than not interests came first 
and indeed that at times policy decisions often to the product of accident and 
intrigue.   
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Preface  
 
This thesis seeks to examine the foreign policy decisions of the New Zealand 
government during the period 1981-1994, in respect of its relations with apartheid 
South Africa. The period 1981-1994 was selected as this is not as well covered by 
historians as the 1960s and 1970s. 1981-1994 falls between the 1981 Springbok 
tour and the 1994 South African election. 1981-1994 therefore is crucial in terms of 
developments in South Africa. Of equal importance is the wider context of southern 
Africa, the Commonwealth, and the Cold War.    
“National Ideals or National Interest?” has been written to try and take into 
account the historiographical advances that have taken place following the 
publication of the last major work on the topic Malcolm Templeton’s Human 
Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand Attitudes to Race Relations in South 
Africa 1921-1994, published by Auckland University Press in 1998.  
“National Ideals” incorporates archive material that was under restriction in 
1997, and recent research about how the apartheid state in South Africa actually 
worked. The often contradictory demands of a powerful external security threat 
frequently conspired in preventing fulsome domestic reform. This dilemma was 
widely misunderstood not only in New Zealand, but also by much of the rest of the 
world.  
The role of the major New Zealand political parties Labour and National, 
and the conflict within the major parties, is an important part of the approach to 
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explaining the formulation of New Zealand foreign policy that has been overlooked 
by other authors. Civil society groups and the pressure they could wield are also 
taken into account. Comparisons are made with Australia and Canada as these 
countries had similar problems and backgrounds to New Zealand. A comparative 
analysis of New Zealand’s Israel policy has also been included for a sense of wider 
perspective on the topic, as this international view is often missing.         
“National Ideals” is by no means a comprehensive investigation, still less a 
definitive work; it is more a broad interpretation in light of new research and 
increased historical perspective. All research has been original and my own.  All 
scriptural references have been taken from the Australasian edition of the Good 
News Bible.  
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Introduction 
 
…I was relieved to learn that following the interim injunction granted 
by the high court of New Zealand, the New Zealand rugby football 
union has decided to cancel this year’s proposed tour of South Africa. 
The people of New Zealand have traditionally been anti-racist and 
proud of being so. In this connection, your government has been an 
admirable representative of the proud tradition, particularly in the 
international campaign against apartheid [underlined in the original]. I 
recall with great pleasure my visit to New Zealand and the hospitality 
you extended to me at the time. I also wish to pay you tribute for your 
invaluable effort in assisting in the just struggle in South Africa, 
particularly in connection with your selfless commitment to the 
cancellation of the tour which left an indelible impression on me… 
 
Joseph Garba, Chair of the United Nations Special Committee Against 
Apartheid to David Lange regarding the cancellation of the 1985 
Springbok tour           
 
The opening quote is from a letter written in 1985 in the files of Archives New 
Zealand, from Joseph Garba, Nigerian envoy to the UN and long-time chair of the 
special committee against apartheid, to David Lange, the then prime minister. The 
letter congratulates Lange on the outcome of the case of Finnegan vs. NZRFU, 
which had ended with a court injunction stopping the official tour.1 However, this 
did not prevent an unofficial ‘Cavaliers’ tour from taking place in 1986. This quote 
illustrates in a succinct and elegant fashion the popular view and misconceptions 
surrounding apartheid and the New Zealand Government. The image of New 
                                                   
1 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 102 NYP Pt. 38 “Political Affairs – South Africa – Apartheid: 
Sports Contacts [06/1985-12/1985]” 1985-1985 
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Zealand as a ‘social laboratory’,  with a foreign policy based on morals and not 
expediency, and  having ‘the best race relations in the world’, was (and to some 
extent, still is) widely spread. In reality, New Zealand foreign policy has leaned 
more strongly on the side of interest and expediency than on that of ‘morals’. This 
is in fact the international norm, and need not be taken negatively. Although there 
has indeed been a long-standing liberal and socialist comment on of racism in New 
Zealand, this was a tradition that was more theoretical than practical. Despite 
official government disapproval, the decisions taken by bodies like NZRFU and 
others were theirs alone to make and the “selfless commitment” of Lange and the 
Labour Party is questionable. Well into the 1970s, there were a number of Labour 
MP’s, in addition to National who were not averse to the charms and patter of the 
South African Consul-General and his staff. Moreover, the National Party was more 
divided over the issue of South Africa than most commentators were and later 
scholars are generally willing to allow.                   
Garba’s letter illustrates another important fact; that despite being on the 
other side of the world, South Africa’s policy of apartheid has been a source of 
contention in New Zealand. The primary sources relating to the subject make it 
clear, and the place events like the 1981 Springbok tour hold in New Zealand’s 
collective memory support this. Although the ‘age of apartheid’ in South Africa, 
and the 1980s and early 1990s in New Zealand are bountiful as far as primary 
sources and contemporary comment are concerned there have been few attempts at 
retrospective analysis. This thesis will be an attempt to rectify this.  
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The closure of the South African Consulate, boycotts, to apply or not to 
apply sanctions to South Africa, and should visas for travel between New Zealand 
and South Africa be withheld. These questions were all part of a larger underlying 
theme that was often not articulated, but informed the debates surrounding the 
topic. This theme is the conflict between the limits of state power and the 
boundaries of civil society, and the rights of private individuals to make decisions 
that may have negative consequences or not be in their best interests. The debates 
surrounding boycotts, social contacts and the whole vexed issue of apartheid 
touched on the problem of the conflict between ideas of civil society for example 
between those who argued for the need to “keep politics out of sport” versus those 
involved in what was in effect an unofficial foreign service. This unofficial 
‘Foreign Service’ comprised the men and women who, despite being private 
citizens, for good or ill represented New Zealand to the wider world in a variety of 
roles, such as aid workers, missionaries, athletes, foreign exchange students, 
tourists, scholars, and artists. It is clear there is not only a conflict of ideals and 
expediency that shapes this topic; but also a conflict between the ideal of the rights 
of individuals and the belief refusing to take a stand against apartheid was a 
betrayal of these rights, not only in New Zealand but also in South Africa.  
Considering specifically the great upsurge of emotion and commotion that 
the issue of sporting sanctions provoked in New Zealand, the cause was the 
question of individual freedoms, including the freedom to be involved with 
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unsavoury characters and events; against the desire, or even need, to make 
sacrifices for the common good. Lurking behind the hoary slogan “keep politics out 
of sport,” was a deeper factor at work beyond racism, naïveté, or ignorance. There 
was a perceived need for government to respect the autonomy of civil society and 
the fear of the precedents direct political intervention might take. The concept of 
“civil society” describes groupings of peoples independent of the state, the family, 
and the market who associate to advance common goals. Civil society is generally 
perceived in the liberal democratic paradigm as a necessary bulwark against the 
potential tyranny of the state, the exploitation of the market and the tribalism and 
nepotism that can be inherent in ties of kinship. More often than not, these bodies 
are the drivers of public opinion and social change. The capture of these groups is 
often a major goal for political movements with hegemonic or authoritarian 
ambitions. It is no surprise therefore that both the apartheid government and the 
liberation movements went to great lengths to infiltrate such groups in South Africa 
to further their political aims; and that many in New Zealand were deeply 
suspicious when it appeared that either the New Zealand government or the anti-
apartheid groups were to do the same.   
Successive New Zealand governments were, with the above in mind 
therefore, highly reluctant to interfere too much in such bodies. This was due 
ultimately to an instinctual understanding of the limits of state power and New 
Zealand’s stronger tradition of independent institutions in comparison with South 
Africa, where civil society was limited and mostly but not completely confined to 
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the educated white enclaves. In retrospect, it is difficult to say if the pro-sanctions 
lobby simply failed to tune into these frequencies. It is possible that they were being 
influenced by the authoritarianism running though the radical wing of the western 
left for most of the twentieth century. In a liberal democracy, options for curtailing 
personal freedom against the greater good are limited; once corners are cut, no 
matter how tempting or well intentioned,  dangerous precedents are set. Although 
some of those who supported maintaining contact with South Africa were racists, 
others wanted to maintain the status quo because they were worried about the 
precedent that might be set for the curtailment of other freedoms.   
This sense of civil society boundaries along with the lack of a defined plan 
were the main reasons the New Zealand government floundered when dealing with 
South Africa in the period. Policy decisions were often the result of populist 
pandering for domestic electoral advantage. In 1978, Muldoon’s government 
election campaign promised not to interfere with the NZRFU internal 
administration, thereby giving permission to let the 1981 Springbok tour go ahead; 
and at the Labour Party 1984 conference Jim Anderton promised to close the South 
African Consulate. He did this without clearing it with David Lange first, locking 
Labour into what was a popular but poorly reasoned policy.2 Such tactics draw 
                                                   
2 Malcolm Templeton, Human Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand Attitudes to 
Race Relations in South Africa 1921-1994, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998, 
p.220. Speaking from a personal point of view, the closure of the Consulate, which served 
no positive purpose and was in many ways more trouble than it was worth, was long 
overdue, but was a decision taken for mostly the wrong reasons on both sides. Templeton 
speculates that Anderton’s coup de main regarding the Consulate may have been motivated, 
in part, by a desire to punish at the South African authorities who refused him permission to 
see political prisoners during a projected visit to South Africa. 
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attention to government decision making, electoral calculation, and populist 
politics, which was often just as important as the response to conflicting goals and 
ideals.     
 
Theoretical Issues  
 
The paradox that drives the foreign relations of most countries in the world 
is the conflict between living up to a country’s ideals and balancing them with its 
practical interests. In addition there is a host of other factors that can shape 
decisions, such as populism, the choices of other nations be they friend or foe, and 
in this case study the changes in South Africa as it became less able to sustain its 
domestic policies. The main consequence of the latter being that many in New 
Zealand, both in and out of government, were forced to rethink their views on 
South Africa, a confronting and confusing process for many. Although most of the 
causes celebres of the twentieth century found their way to New Zealand’s shores, 
the anti-apartheid movement, along with the movements to ban nuclear testing and 
the protests against the war in Vietnam, had the greatest impact and stirred the most 
passion. Less well known are the problems that South Africa posed for successive 
New Zealand governments. Although apartheid never enjoyed fulsome support 
amongst New Zealand’s political elite, the way forward was not always clear.  
International relations experts often present the relations between states as a 
smooth quadrille amongst statesmen and diplomats of great powers with clear 
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agendas; unencumbered by pesky distractions such as public opinion, human rights, 
or multilateralism (the allusions to the Congress of Vienna are intentional). This is 
not how it works at all.  
At a domestic level, in a western democracy such as New Zealand, friction 
between political parties and within political parties, along with the vagaries of 
public opinion, are all major factors in the formation of a government’s strategy for 
dealing with other governments, many of which also the face the same problems. 
For the same reasons, the ways in which events, people and places are viewed in the 
popular imagination, even if these perceptions contradict the reality of what is 
actually happening, is of vital importance. In this thesis, it is clear that the divisions 
within Labour and National did as much as the divide between the two parties to 
shape government strategy regarding South Africa. Until the switch to MMP in 
1996, elections were based on the Plurality Voting, that is, FPP system that usually 
returned with a few exceptions one party governments, and not the multi-party 
coalitions that have become the norm under MMP. The divisions within the parties 
therefore take on greater importance than under MMP.  
Analysis of New Zealand policy should take into account the actual 
workings of the apartheid state. Because of its democratic deficit, the South African 
state in the years 1981-1994 was weaker and more vulnerable than it would have 
been under other circumstances. This weakness, and the posturing that the 
Nationalists adopted to compensate, was overlooked or misinterpreted by New 
Zealand policy makers, especially those in the Labour Party. Another 
8 
 
    
misconception that has surrounded the analysis of New Zealand foreign policy 
towards South Africa during apartheid is definitional - how does one define South 
Africa? It is easy to overlook, but for most of the period in question, the African 
National Congress ran its own “diplomatic” service parallel to that of the de jure 
South African government.3 The anti-apartheid groups in New Zealand were 
frequently in touch with these de facto embassies. These offices were often the ones 
that helped with the attempts to campaign for third party sanctions. For the sake of 
New Zealand’s international reputation, the government had to take account of 
these ‘gadflies ‘and relations with South Africa in this context and time period 
therefore meant both the official Afrikaner Nationalist South African or “apartheid” 
government in Pretoria and the de facto ANC “black” government in waiting.  
In history, there is a temptation to divide groups into heroes and villains, 
victims and exploiters. This approach is both unhelpful and misleading as there are 
plenty of skeletons in the closets of all the major participants. To quote the then 
head of the South African armed forces General Constand Viljoen, “Why can’t we 
all agree we all have dirty hands? We fought a war that should have been avoided at 
the start or stopped at a much earlier stage. We fought a dirty war.”4 The wider 
geopolitical setting also needs to be taken into account as well, and the unrest in 
South Africa in the period 1984-1994 needs to be seen in that context. Southern 
                                                   
3 See for example reports form the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra regarding 
the office of the ANC and how to juggle the two see, ABHS W5533 22128 Box 35 CBA 
30/2/2 Pt. 1 150842 “South Africa Sporting Contacts 1982-1983 Canberra Files” 1982-1983 
4 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People, London: Hurst and Company,  
2003,  p. 655  
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Africa, for much of the period under consideration (1974-1990), following the 
collapse of the Portuguese empire and the destabilisation of its former colonies of 
Angola and Mozambique, became the subject of great power conflict, reflected in 
the stationing of 30,000 troops of the Soviet proxy Cuba near the border between 
Namibia, then under South African rule, and Angola. These facts were of great 
importance, along with perceived developments in UDI Rhodesia, after 1980 
Zimbabwe, which was seen by many New Zealand policy makers as a dry run for 
potential developments in South Africa when apartheid was finally abolished and 
majority rule implemented.  
 
Apartheid and the International Opposition.      
 
Although this thesis concerns successive New Zealand governments of the 
1980s and 1990s, it is important to convey a proper understanding of apartheid and 
of South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. It is not only important to understand what 
policy makers in New Zealand had to deal with but also the origins of their 
misconceptions about apartheid, such as that it was ‘fascist’ or that it was 
dominated by the military. Segregation and racial hierarchies were a part of life in 
South Africa; ranging from the master-servant relationships based on colour in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Cape Colony to the sorting of blood 
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transfusions by the race of their donors in the twentieth.5 The development of these 
patterns of segregation and the growth of the modern South African state are 
closely intertwined. The modern South African state came into being in 1910, nine 
years after the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) which ended the independent 
Afrikaner states; the older African kingdoms, most notable the Zulu empire, had 
been vanquished by the British some thirty years previously. 6 One of the reasons 
the Boers agreed to integration into the British Empire was the perceived need for a 
common “Natives’ Policy.” A result of this was the nationwide application of 
segregation laws that had previously been confined either to the British founded 
province of Natal or to the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State. 7 Another result of Union was a nationwide economic policy that allowed the 
government to unlock the economic potential of the country previously hampered 
by internal barriers and weak regional governments. The formation of the Union 
now made exploiting the black population as cheap labour for the mines and farms 
easier.  
The Homelands8 policy, the cornerstone of apartheid, involved creating a 
number of smaller states based around the main ethnic groups in South Africa, 
                                                   
5 Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa: The Story Of The Rise And Fall Of Apartheid, 
London: Mandarin, 1990, passim; Giliomee, Afrikaners, passim; R. W Johnson, South 
Africa: The First Man, The Last Nation, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2004, passim; 
Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided 
Society. Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1991  passim 
6 Donal Lowry, “When The World Loved The Boers” in, History Today, Vol. 49, No. 5, 
May 1999,  pp. 43-49   
7 All South African provincial terms refer to the pre 1994 regional boundaries.   
8 The Homelands are, however, better known by their pejorative term the Bantustans; a 
portmanteau of Bantu, a general term for all black South Africans that has now fallen out of 
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which would then be joined in a regional economic union with other states of the 
region; a clear forerunner to the modern Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the basis of much of contemporary South Africa’s foreign 
policy.  
In reality however, the Homelands were puny, and often they were on the 
worst agricultural land in South Africa. Despite the huge amounts of money that 
Pretoria pumped into them, they were in effect giant holding pens for a labour force 
for the farms, mines, and factories in white South Africa. The available evidence 
points to Hendrick Verwoerd as the originator of the Homelands policy, as well as a 
number of other major pieces of apartheid legislation. The vicious crackdown on 
opposition to the government following the Sharpeville shootings was also 
Verwoerd’s responsibility. Life on the ground in South Africa in this period was 
more complex and contradictory than reports would lead us to believe. The failings 
of the South African government’s policies and the lack of concern  for the majority 
of the country for whose interests they claimed to be acting was real enough; But it 
was not the whole story. The South African Government’s paranoia and confusion 
is illustrated in a government White Paper from the 1970s in which the enemies of 
(white) South Africa were listed as  
 
Leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism, 
and related ideologies…black racism, exaggerated individual freedom, 
                                                                                                                                  
favour due to its political connotations, and the suffix “–stan’,’ a reference to the bogus 
internal republics of the USSR. The term Homelands will be used from this point onwards.    
12 
 
    
one-man one-vote…boycotts, isolation, demonstrations…undermining 
activities and limited violence. 9 
 
Hendrick Verwoerd was quite possibly the most able man to rule South Africa. His 
prime ministership of South Africa left a more lasting impact on the Republic than 
that of any South African politician since.10 After becoming Prime Minister in 1958 
until his assassination in 1966, the South African economy grew at an 
unprecedented rate, foreign investment flowed in, and South Africa gained the 
finest infrastructure on the continent.11 Despite these very real achievements, 
Verwoerd’s balance sheet is firmly in the deficit; he is not known as the “architect 
of apartheid” for nothing. 12  
To speak of apartheid, therefore, as a simple monolith, the “walls of 
granite” of South African Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd’s turn of phrase, is 
not only misleading but also dangerous. Strictly speaking, the period from 1948 
until 1994 falls into three phrases. The first phase, 1948-1960, was simply an 
intensification of the old British based segregation laws and colonial labour system 
following the social and economic upheavals of the Second World War. 13 The 
second phase from 1960-1983, the period the Homelands were created, is thought 
                                                   
9 “South African Government White Paper on Defence and Arms Production 1973” Quoted 
in Alexander Johnston “Weak States and National Security: The Case of South Africa in the 
Era of Total Strategy” in, Review of International Studies, Vol.17 No. 2, (April 1991),  p. 
151   
10 Hans Pienaar,  “No. 3: Hendrick Verwoerd 1901-1966” in, They Shaped Our Century: 
The Most Influential South Africans Of The Twentieth Century, Cape Town: Human and 
Rousseau, 1999, pp. 22-26        
11 For an insightful analysis on Verwoerd and his legacy see Giliomee, Afrikaners,  pp. 536-
541 
12 Sparks, The Mind Of South Africa,  pp. 192-202   
13 Giliomee Afrikaners, pp. xiii-xix      
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of as being the most stereotypically representative of apartheid. The draconian 
censorship and political laws from this period consolidated Nationalist rule but 
were also passed in reaction to the state of emergency following the Sharpeville 
shootings of 1960 and later the assassination of Hendrick Verwoerd in 1966. As 
well as internal problems, there was also the growing number of disasters that were 
taking hold in much of the rest of decolonised Africa.14 The third phase from 1983-
1994 covers the period in which a number of belated reforms were made and the 
need to find a way of combating the very well-orchestrated campaign by the ANC, 
the chief liberation movement, became the government’s overriding priority.    
The best interpretation of the apartheid years in South Africa is that of a 
clash of nationalisms between Afrikaner and African nationalism. African 
nationalism, a side effect of the Union of South Africa following the Anglo-Boer 
War (1899-1902) that the white rulers of South Africa had not anticipated, was a 
product of missionary education, the spread of English as the language of 
interethnic communication, and urbanisation. Although easily written off at the 
time, it was certainly less of a threat than the more virulent Afrikaner nationalism. 
Afrikaner nationalism was a reaction to the use of English as the official language 
and the humiliations of defeat and poverty. The two nationalisms developed around 
the same time for related reasons. 
                                                   
14 ibid pp. 487-541; for more information  on  the rest of southern Africa during the period 
see Martin Meredith, The State Of Africa: A History Of The Continent Since Independence,  
London: Simon and Schuster, 2011, passim 
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This clash of nationalisms explains a great deal but there are a number of 
other external factors at work. One of the reasons regimes are often unwilling to 
abandon power is because they fear what may take its place. This was the case with 
the Nationalist Party in South Africa. It needs, at this point, to be made explicitly 
clear that although the apartheid government made a number of unnecessary 
problems for itself, an even larger number of challenges that it faced were not of its 
own making. The challenges that South Africa faced in the 1980s, of which the 
most important were a rapidly expanding population, unorganised urbanisation, the 
Cold War, and the growing economic and social problems that defined Africa 
following the end of colonialism, were also faced by most of South Africa’s 
neighbours.15 The overwhelming sense of danger and encirclement that informed 
the governments thinking on the danger of abandoning the laager was clear in 
many of South African government’s actions.  
One of the main factors to influence the end of apartheid was the end of the 
Cold War; no USSR meant no Soviet money for the ANC. The repeated 
humiliations that (white) South Africa underwent in a number of international 
forums were having an impact, and few in South Africa enjoyed living in a fortress 
state. The importance of international forums to New Zealand policy makers 
increased due to cost constraints meaning that these forums were often the only 
places where New Zealand diplomats could sound out the views of their African 
counterparts on issues like sporting contacts and sanctions. Sporting contacts were a 
                                                   
15 Meredith, passim  
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particular headache. The majority of the ministry’s cables on the subject of South 
Africa were about that issue. Of lesser public importance were cultural links. The 
New Zealand Film Commission during this period was able to sell films and 
television shows not only to South African distributors but to a number of film 
festivals as well.16 It is easy at first glance to dismiss the subject of sporting ties as 
frivolous or unimportant. This is a mistake. Sporting ties were the main basis for 
person-to-person contact (this applies to cultural contacts as well) and often led to 
business and political links which were economically important. Using boycotts and 
sanctions and ensuring they were enforced and monitored was an important part of 
the strategy of isolation. It was all part of the broader disinvestment campaign.  
There is also good anecdotal evidence that despite the effects on living 
standards the economic sanctions had, the sporting boycott, especially the ban on 
international rugby and cricket tours, had the most psychological impact. South 
Africa, like many new world states, including New Zealand, placed great store on 
international sporting contests as a form of national self-assertion, and regarded 
victories in such arenas with great pride. The denial of what was for many South 
Africans a very important expression of national identity was a major blow.  
Informal negotiations to end apartheid began in the late 1978 when the 
possibility of both genuine power sharing and real economic reform on white terms 
                                                   
16 ADMA W5652 22513 Box 11 2 “South Africa [General Marketing and Sales] 1981-
1983” 1981-1983; ADMA W5652 22513 Box 56 4 “South Africa - Festivals to 1985” 1983-
1985;  ADMA W5652 22513 Box 118 4 “South Africa [General Sales and Marketing] 
1980-1981” 1980-1981; ADMA W5652 22513 Box 128 4 “South Africa 1984-1986” 1984-
1986; ADMA W5652 22513 Box 173 5 “Sleeping Dogs – South Africa 1978-1983” 1978-
1983 1986; ADMA W5652 Box 303 2 “South Africa General File 1987-1993” 1987-1993; 
ADMA W5652 22513 Box 303 “South Africa General File 1987-1993” 1987-1993  
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was possible. 17 There had been overtures from Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader 
of the Inkatha Freedom Party18 and Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Homeland. By 
far the most able of the Homelands rulers, Buthelezi in conjunction with members 
of the main white opposition MPs from the Progressive Federal Party 19 in the 
South African parliament proposed a plan for federal devolution to the provinces 
and reform of the economy and genuine power sharing. However due to a 
combination of political cowardice and internal opposition no progress was made. 20  
All of these issues would be of great significance to both the New Zealand 
policy makers in Wellington and the staff of the Harare High Commission in the 
1990s. These unresolved issues were a partial cause of the wave of violence that 
swept South Africa. In 1978, John Vorster, then Prime Minister of South Africa, 
was forced to resign following the uncovering of the ‘Information Scandal’ or 
Muldergate. Muldergate, named for the Information Minister Connie Mulder, 
involved the use of illegal currency controls and a government slush fund to 
bankroll a propaganda campaign, including the establishment of a pro-government 
                                                   
17 Johnson, The First Man, p. 184 
18 The Inkatha Freedom Party, a mainly Zulu ethnic party with strong roots in KwaZulu-
Natal, they initially enjoyed strong ties to the ANC but later became a major rival on the 
ANC’s right flank in the 1980s and 1990s.  The split seems to have been prompted by 
concerns within the ANC that certain ethnic groups, Zulu’s in particular, were being 
overlooked for patronage and advancement within the party in favour of Xhosas, who 
formed the core of the ANC’s leadership.        
19 The Progressive Federal Party was one of the many manifestations of the tearaway group 
of seven MPs who broke away from the now defunct United Party, then the main opposition 
party, as the Progressive Party in 1959, later becoming the Democratic Party in 1989, and is 
now the modern day opposition to the ANC in the South African parliament, the 
Democratic Alliance. For a number of years this fearless band of men and women probed, 
questioned and embarrassed the Nationalists every opportunity they got and in many ways 
did more to undermine Apartheid than the Liberation movements, with their slogans and 
bootleg weapons, ever could have hoped to do so.      
20 Johnson, The First Man, p. 184 
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English language newspaper The Citizen.21 The Information Scandal did much to 
undermine the prestige of the government, which otherwise compared favourably to 
other regimes in Africa on matters such as corruption and morality. Despite this 
fact, it does not seem to have had much impact on perceptions of the nationalists in 
New Zealand, as Muldergate is not mentioned in a number of New Zealand 
politician’s memoirs. Nonetheless, Muldergate had a greatly negative impact on 
South Africa’s already poor standing abroad. This left the stage open for greater 
involvement of the military in South African politics. Just how much influence the 
military had in South African politics during the 1980s and 1990s is open to debate. 
The appointment of a former Defence Minister, P.W Botha as Prime Minister, and 
an actively serving general, Magnus Malan, as the Minister of Defence, went 
against the convention in most parliamentary systems. These appointments along 
with a massive increase in military spending and tightening of conscription laws 
implied that South Africa might be heading for a military takeover. 22    
New Zealand perceptions frequently failed to consider these obstacles. 
Instead, many in New Zealand saw a desire to dominate Southern Africa or at least 
a wish not to relinquish white South Africa’s considerable wealth that had been 
                                                   
21 For more about Muldergate see; Johnson, The First Man, pp. 177-179; William Beinart, 
Twentieth Century South Africa, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2001 p 
243; F.W de Klerk, The Last Trek: A New Beginning, London: Pan Books 2000 pp. 59-60; 
Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms: Memoirs, London: Sinclair Stevenson 1993 pp. 
195-197;  James Barber, “BOSS in Britain” in African Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 328 (July 1983) 
pp. 311-328. Ironically, The Citizen is still in publication today as a respected daily and has 
a predominantly black readership.       
22 For more information on the role of the military in South African politics see Deon Fourie 
“The New South Africa and the Armed Forces” in South Africa: Designing New Institutions 
ed. Murray Faure and Jan-Erik Lane,  London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE 
Publications 1996  pp. 151-180      
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partially acquired at the expense and exploitation of the black population. The main 
motivating factors behind the actions of the Nationalist government were defensive 
and motivated by fear. These reasons are strongly grounded in South Africa’s 
modern history and are the more likely explanations.        
 
 
The New Zealand Approach in Comparison: Australia, Canada, and Israel    
 
Taking the broader view of New Zealand policies in the 1980s, a 
comparative approach may be useful in understanding the challenges and the 
choices of successive New Zealand governments during the period. As a 
comparison, it is worthwhile to consider countries with similar histories and 
problems to New Zealand. The two countries that are similar enough to New 
Zealand in this context are Australia and Canada. Australian foreign policy is 
similar to New Zealand although more connected to Asia for reasons of history and 
geography. There is not a lot written on the subject on Australian foreign policy on 
apartheid, which is surprising. There were, however, similarities’ to the problems 
that the New Zealand government faced. Both had ties to South Africa, had sent 
troops to the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, both had major sporting contacts with 
South Africa, both had on-going issues about colonisation and immigration, and 
both later grew to have large anti-apartheid movements with strong support within 
left leaning governments of the period.  
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These similarities did not lead to a common front on the issue of South 
Africa in the 1980s. Although the Hawke-Keating administrations held similar 
views on South Africa to their New Zealand counterparts, clashes over ANZUS and 
nuclear ships meant that despite much common ground between the two, there was 
never going to be a simpatico relationship and what could have been an effective 
united front was diluted by conflict over other issues and clashes of personalities. 23 
Australia’s anti-apartheid movement was capable of producing violence and civil 
disorder on the same scale as New Zealand, and like New Zealand coalesced 
around the issue of sporting contacts. In Australia, cricket was the main target of 
protests; rugby was a secondary concern, an inversion of the situation in New 
Zealand. Not only did the Australian government have to deal with the scandal of 
on-going rebel cricket tours of South Africa well until the 1980s, there was also a 
Springbok tour of Australia in 1971 that notoriously ended with some 700 people 
arrested across Australia and a month long state of emergency declared in 
Queensland. Unlike New Zealand, the South African government enjoyed full 
representation in Australia, and many Australian companies, in particular the 
mining sector, a vital industry in Australia, had significant investments in South 
Africa that they were anxious to maintain. Australia shared New Zealand’s 
problems vis-à-vis apartheid but the stakes were higher.  
                                                   
23 Bob Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1994, pp. 265, 279-
286.  
Hawke in particular is useful when used in conjunction with Michael Bassett’s memoirs of 
the Lange government as a corrective to some of Lange’s more outrageous claims about the 
anti-nuclear policy and other controversial aspects of New Zealand-Australian relations of 
the 1980s.  
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Canada is also an interesting case study. Canada’s relationship to South 
Africa was similar to that of New Zealand in that like South Africa both were 
Commonwealth countries and former dominions of the British Empire, with similar 
issues on indigenous peoples and immigration. Beyond this, there is greater scope 
for contrast than the obvious comparison between New Zealand and Australia. 
Canada’s ideas on foreign policy were more coherent, its stated goal being the need 
to “Build bridges of understanding between the affluent industrial white nations, 
and the poor, underdeveloped, non-white majority of the world.” 24 Canada’s South 
Africa policy caused relatively little controversy and was from 1960 onwards, 
consistent in comparison with stances taken in New Zealand. This relative lack of 
trouble may have stemmed from the fact that “The ties between Canada and South 
Africa…were more emotional than substantial,” according to a one time Canadian 
High Commissioner to South Africa. 25 Canada-South Africa relations were not a 
source of trouble to Canada in itself. This did not mean they were not affected by 
the problems that South African issues could pose on the international stage. 
Canada had been negatively affected by the sporting boycotts of the Olympics and 
Commonwealth games, Montreal and Edmonton respectively. The Montreal 
                                                   
24 Brian Douglas Tennyson, “Canadian Policy towards South Africa” in Africa Today, Vol. 
29, No. 1 Namibia, South Africa and the West, (First Quarter 1982), pp. 3-20; see also Ian 
O. Cameron, “Canada, The Commonwealth and South Africa: National Foreign Policy 
Making in a Multilateral Environment” in, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 18, No. 2, (June 1989), pp. 205-225  
25 James Bartleman, On Six Continents: A Life in Canada’s Foreign Service 1966-2002, 
Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2004, p. 237. Bartleman was also displeased to discover that the 
ruling ANC simply saw Canada as a milch cow of development money and not as a 
business partner, noting ruefully that the countries that kept their trade offices open whilst 
sanctions had been imposed were being given preferential treatment.    
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Olympics were boycotted by 28 African nations following the refusal of the IOC to 
expel New Zealand from the Olympics after the 1976 All Blacks tour of South 
Africa. Edmonton only had the single boycott of Nigeria. It was still a major 
embarrassment for Canada and damaged New Zealand-Canada relations. 26       
 
Despite this ‘one off’, Canada was not burdened with having any major 
sporting contacts with South Africa as this Harare High Commission dispatch from 
20 March 1991 makes clear, 
 
We asked whether [the Canadian government] was considering any 
refinements to its application of Gleneagles. Edwards said that external 
was looking at this. But it might not be easy. As you know, Canadian 
legislation bans the entry of any South African wishing to come to 
Canada for sports-related activities. In effect (as you know too well) this 
ban has not been of great relevance in Canada’s situation given that they 
did not have any major sporting links in any of the key areas...They now 
had the case of an individual who wished to come and give a paper to a 
university related sports conference. Edwards noted that Gleneagles 
referred only to sport competition, not sport-related activities; she did 
not know what the outcome of their current deliberations would be. 
Perhaps Canada might wait for the CW [Commonwealth] to approve 
certain contacts as being in the interests of unification and sports 
development in SA e.g. entry into Canada of SA coaches. Perhaps 
Canada would use a guideline that persons from a unified sport would 
[be] permitted entry. But some of their applications were from 
balloonists, hang-gliders and sail-boarders. Canada would want to 
consult further on this before the Delhi CFM [Commonwealth Foreign 
Ministers] but Edwards gave us to believe that they would probably 
                                                   
26 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 41 “Political – South Africa – Apartheid 
Sporting Contacts [08/1989-12/1991]” 1989-1991  
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proceed slowly. She assured me she would stay in touch as their 
thinking progressed.   
To conclude Edwards expressed Canada’s concern that the sporting 
contacts issue not break down into a white CW versus black CW one. 
There would be a need to “manage our rhetoric” (she referred 
specifically to statements by Mr Hawke, including one made yesterday). 
This, she thought, tended to put pressure on the FLS [Front Line States] 
possibly making them difficult. 27  
 
 
The context of the strategies that the New Zealand government pursued can also be 
viewed  in comparison with other countries that posed similar problems of 
contested nationhood and possible ostracism like those which South Africa posed, 
and in particular Israel.28 A number of people made the linkage between the 
problems of the Middle East and apartheid in the period. The anti-apartheid groups 
were taken to task more than a few times by the leaders of the New Zealand Jewish 
community for what they, and many others, deemed unfair and inappropriate public 
comparisons and statements from the group on the Middle East. 29       
The approaches the New Zealand government has taken over the years to 
relations with Israel and to relations with South Africa during apartheid’s heyday 
were quite different. New Zealand had been a supporter of the state of Israel, 
                                                   
27 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 42 “Political Affairs – South Africa – 
Apartheid Sporting Contacts [01/1991-05/1994]” 1991-1994  
28 For students of New Zealand foreign policy who are more interested in finding out about 
New Zealand – Israeli relations see Malcolm Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire: New 
Zealand Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis, Auckland: Auckland 
University Press 1994. This is not an endorsement of the Israel –apartheid analogy. The 
Israel-apartheid analogy is intellectually lazy and deeply flawed.  
29 ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 2 “Republic of South Africa: Social Affairs 
– Apartheid: H.A.R.T [Halt All Racist Tours] [12/87-07/85] 1982-1985  
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having voted in favour of the 1947 partition resolution despite heavy British and 
Commonwealth pressure to abstain. Malcolm Templeton in his book on the Suez 
crisis puts this down to the Labour Party’s sympathy for the socialist character of 
the early Israeli state as well as latent Holocaust guilt over restrictive pre-war 
immigration policies.30 There are a number of parallels between contemporary 
Israel and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Israel, like apartheid South Africa, 
was and is theoretically a liberal democracy with multiple political parties, a free 
press, healthy economy and vigorous (albeit limited) civil society. Both were and 
are countries that Pakeha New Zealand could more readily identify with than the 
neighbouring autocratic monarchies, secular dictatorships and later theocratic 
republics; or for that matter Africa’s one party states, military dictatorships, and 
failed colonies.  
All these comparisons show that New Zealand’s South Africa problem, 
although irritating, was far from unique. The solutions, although often 
disappointing, were far from out of the ordinary. Australia was forced to navigate 
most of the same obstacles that New Zealand had to in its dealings with South 
Africa. Canada was not as affected by the same problems of New Zealand or 
Australia, but it did not completely avoid the trouble that South Africa could cause 
either. New Zealand’s Israel policy shows that a lack of public interest can be a 
major asset for politicians and diplomats.  
 
                                                   
30 Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire, passim  
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Historiography  
 
Despite the heroic mythology that has been built around the events of the 
1981 Springbok tour, public attitudes were divided and many still supported what 
could be termed constructive engagement with South Africa for a variety of 
reasons, some more noble than others. There is no definitive account of the 1981 
Springbok Tour, only memoirs of varying quality, a chapter in Malcolm 
Templeton’s Human Rights and Sporting Contacts and a number of retrospective 
articles in newspapers and magazines that appeared during anniversaries of the 
tour.31 The best account of the 1981 Springbok Tour so far is the television 
documentary 1981: A Country at War, commissioned by Television New Zealand 
in 2003.32 Unlike much of the written material, it is even-handed, fair, and 
informative. A second documentary commissioned for Television New Zealand, 
Try Revolution (2006),33 covers the reaction to the tour in South Africa providing 
the international context.    
  In addition to this, events in South Africa were more complicated than the 
traditional accounts would allow. The tide of historical opinion is beginning to turn 
as it is becoming clear that the roots of South Africa’s social and political 
dysfunction go back longer than 1948, and that apartheid may well have been the 
                                                   
31 Trevor Richards, Dancing On Our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and 
Racism, Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1999, passim; Redmer Yska “The Tour Files” 
in The New Zealand Listener, 9-15 July 2011,  pp. 14-20; Templeton, Human Rights, pp. 
178-290      
32 1981: A Country At War, dir. Rachel Jean and Owen Hughes, Frame Up Films, 2003  
33 Exposé: Try Revolution ,dir. Leana Pooley, Pacific Films, 2006 
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symptom and not the cause. This assumption of apartheid being the cause of all of 
South Africa’s ills had a huge bearing on how other nations related to South Africa 
in the period 1948-1994, and this in turn, affected South Africa’s approach to 
overcoming these challenges.  
The scholarship surrounding New Zealand-South Africa relations between 
1981 and 1994 has been covered by first person accounts from those involved in the 
anti-apartheid movement in New Zealand and elsewhere. Trevor Richards’ Dancing 
on our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism,34 is a prominent 
example. These anti-apartheid movement accounts are not so much histories as 
memoirs with supplementary material. Because these are often participant memoirs, 
opinions and the settling of old scores can preclude fair and balanced accounts. This 
particularly applies to the treatment of those who supported continuing links to 
South Africa and argued that constructive engagement was more effective than 
sanctions and international ostracism. These accounts also overlook both the wider 
context of the Cold War and its ending. They also interpret any argument or ideas 
in support of contact as apartheid propaganda.   
The main scholarly work on New Zealand-South Africa relations is 
Malcolm Templeton’s Human Rights and Sporting Contacts, authored by a former 
New Zealand diplomat. 35  Human Rights is based on research from the archives of 
the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs covering the years 1921-1994. The 
                                                   
34 Richards, passim 
35 Malcolm Templeton, Human Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand Attitudes to 
Race Relations in South Africa 1921-1994, Auckland: Auckland University Press 1998 
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title implies a narrower focus than actually is the case as other factors such as 
business, sanctions, and the international context of New Zealand foreign policy are 
covered. Templeton was unable to conduct research in South Africa and at the time 
of writing could not access the archives of the New Zealand Rugby Union and the 
South African Rugby Union. Templeton’s approach might have been influenced by 
the time he spent employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that many 
of the ministry’s materials were still officially under classification in 1998 may also 
have importance.  
Other major works useful for this study are those of political scientist and 
biographer Barry Gustafson. His biography of Robert Muldoon, which deals with 
the 1981 tour at length and his history of the National Party, written in 1986 
provide valuable context. There is as yet no full-length biography of David Lange. 
The closest is a lengthy political study of the Lange cabinet by Michael Bassett. 
Other works include an early introductory study of Lange by Vernon Wright from 
1984, Lange’s own memoirs, posthumously published in 2005, and Barry 
Gustafson’s entry on Lange in the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography.36  In the 
                                                   
36 Barry Gustafson. 'Lange, David Russell', in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography 
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/6l1/lange-david-russell; Michael Bassett, 
Working With David: Inside the Lange Cabinet, Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett, 2008; 
David Lange, My Life Auckland: Viking 2005, passim; Vernon Wright, David Lange: 
Prime Minister, A Portrait, Wellington: Unwin Paperbacks 1984 passim; Jon Johansson, 
Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership, Wellington: Dunmore Publishing, 2005, 
passim.  
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absence of a full-scale biography of David Lange, the Bassett study is of the 
greatest value.37           
David J McCraw’s “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: in the 
National Tradition?” 38  is one of series of articles on New Zealand’s foreign policy 
and the approaches of the two main parties. These articles examines the policies of 
the National Party of the 1990s and the growing influence of public opinion on 
policy making, a factor that had become more important during the Fourth Labour 
Government. National’s foreign policy was often unfairly seen as fawning over 
what once was the Empire, toadying to the Americans, or simply looking for 
markets. 39 This interpretation, although it certainly has a lot of truth in it, is not the 
whole story. It is true that the National Party had historically placed a greater 
emphasis on maintaining links to New Zealand’s traditional allies and protectors as 
well as the necessity of promoting trade. For these reasons trade falls under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not a department of commerce or 
economic development. Often overlooked was National’s strong commitment to 
multilateralism and internationalism, evidenced by its support for the United 
Nations and persistence in giving monetary aid to various countries and 
                                                   
37 Barry Gustafson, His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon, Auckland: Auckland 
University Press 2000 passim; Barry Gustafson, The First Fifty Years: A History of the 
National Party, Auckland: Reed Methuen 1986 passim; Bassett, passim   
38 David J. McCraw “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: in the National 
Tradition?” in Pacific Review Vol. 13, No.4 2000 pp. 577-594   
39 Malcolm McKinnon, Independence And Foreign Policy: New Zealand In the World Since 
1935, Auckland: Auckland University Press 1993, pp. 12-13    
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international funds. 40 National, as the 1981 Springbok tour illustrated, was as 
capable as a Labour government of making nationalistic stands on certain issues. 
There is also an unfair perception of the New Zealand National Party as racist in 
popular historical understanding in New Zealand. This undoubtedly is owing to the 
fact that with a few exceptions i.e. Barry Gustafson, the great majority of the New 
Zealand historical and political science profession are somewhere on the left of the 
political spectrum. In the 1970s one author, M.P.K. Sorrenson, could even go as far 
to say that the South African Nationalists and New Zealand National parties only 
differed in degrees as to their core philosophies and beliefs, especially regarding 
race, immigration, and indigenous issues. 41 These accusations are a reflection of 
unhappiness with the Muldoon government of the 1970s. Sorrenson ignores the fact 
that historically centre left parties in New Zealand, that is, the Liberals and their 
successors the Labour Party often pandered to the same ideas to win votes and 
elections, the only difference is that Labour abandoned support for race based 
immigration restrictions in the 1970s.   
While the effectiveness of the campaign to withdraw financial investment 
from South Africa’s corporations is debated, other boycotts, especially the sporting 
boycott, are generally agreed to have been successful. Two articles by Douglas 
Booth: “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports 
                                                   
40 Merwyn Norrish “Introduction” in New Zealand in World Affairs III 1972-1990 ed. Bruce 
Brown Wellington Victoria University Press in association with NZIIA ,1999,  pp. 9-19  
41 M.P.K. Sorrenson “Uneasy Bedfellows: A Survey of New Zealand’s Relations With 
South Africa” in New Zealand, South Africa and Sport: Background Papers, Wellington: 
NZIIA, 1976,  p. 35      
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Boycott” in Journal of Contemporary History and “The Southern African Council 
of Sport and the Political Antinomies of the Sports Boycott” in Journal of Southern 
African Studies make this point.42 John Carlin’s Playing the Enemy is a history of 
the politics behind the 1995 Rugby World Cup and its role in attempting to build a 
common sense of nationhood in South Africa. 43 These publications touch on many 
of the topics of this thesis including the impact of international boycotts and 
changing attitudes. Other aspects of relations covered in a number of contemporary 
scholarly articles deal with disinvestment, geo-strategic policy, and the impact of 
the collapse of the USSR on policy and changing internal dynamics within South 
Africa. Examples of contemporary analysis include, “South Africa: Is Botha’s Total 
Strategy a Programme of Reform?” in Review of African Political Economy; 
Timothy D. Sisk, “White Politics in South Africa: Polarisation under Pressure” in 
Africa Today; and Alexander Johnston, “Weak States and National Security: The 
Case of South Africa in the Era of Total Strategy” in Review of International 
Studies. 44 Also deserving of an honourable mention is the late Samuel P. 
                                                   
42 Douglas Booth, “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports 
Boycott” in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 38, No. 3 Sport and Politics, (July 
2003),  pp. 477-493; Douglas Booth , “The Southern African Council of Sport and the 
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No.1, (March 1997), pp. 51-66   
43 John Carlin, Invictus: Nelson Mandela and the Game that Made a Nation, London: 
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Review of African Political Economy No. 19 Conscientious and Class, (September – 
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Huntington’s 1992 article “How Countries Democratize” on the democratising of 
authoritarian regimes, which provide much insight into the challenges, and 
obstacles any would be reformers faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 45       
There are only a few histories of New Zealand foreign policy, with most of 
the relevant literature falling into the category of International Relations and 
Political Science. In these areas, essays and chapters in Beyond New Zealand and 
Beyond New Zealand II as well as the New Zealand in World Affairs series, all 
contain useful material.46 Single volumes include Independence and Foreign Policy 
by Malcolm McKinnon.47 The article “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy under 
National and Labour Governments: Variation on the “Small State” Theme?” by 
David J McCraw in Pacific Affairs, gives a good background on the general 
patterns of both major political parties during the period. 48 
The literature on apartheid South Africa often assumes that until the reform 
phase of the 1980s and 1990s government practice was stable, and impervious to 
outside influence. This is a result of both ignorance and propaganda. It is possible 
to acknowledge that apartheid was, paradoxically, a broad and flexible system of 
thought, without condoning it. A number of works that dispute the monolithic and 
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46 Beyond  New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State, ed. John Henderson, Keith 
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simplistic view of apartheid are now being published; unfortunately, they have 
appeared too recently to be able to be used in this thesis. Like most authoritarian 
states, South Africa was, in the period under consideration, fundamentally a weak 
state because of its democratic deficit. This Achilles heel is often ignored in the 
popular literature, but has been acknowledged by analysts and historians for some 
time.  
Of general histories of South Africa, the best is R.W Johnson’s South 
Africa: The First Man, The Last Nation. 49 Although Johnson is not a historian, this 
work is in many ways superior to the works often cited as the conventional Liberal 
and Marxist histories of South Africa. It includes a useful preface regarding the 
state of the writing of history in South Africa. Worthy of mention is Hermann 
Giliomee’s The Afrikaners,50 one of the few histories of the period that examines 
the ideas of the time with a critical eye. There are a number of journalistic accounts 
that can be used cautiously. The majority are the work of foreign correspondents 
stationed in South Africa in the 1980s -1990s whose knowledge was limited by 
both language and the dangers of travelling in certain parts of the country. This was 
a time of rapid change, some books dated very quickly as reasonable assumptions 
about conditions, and events often disproved trends. These books are still useful in 
capturing the zeitgeist of the times and illustrating popular perceptions of events in 
South Africa. Patti Waldmeir’s Anatomy of a Miracle, David Ottaway’s Chained 
                                                   
49 R.W Johnson, South Africa, The First Man The Last Nation,  London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson 2004  
50 Giliomee, Afrikaners, passim   
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Together, and Sebastian Mallaby’s After Apartheid; authored by the foreign 
correspondents for the Financial Times, the Washington Post, and The Economist 
respectively, are some of the better examples of contemporary accounts of this 
period. 51  
On a more general note, one of the major challenges of this topic is the 
abundance of material on the period because it was one of the great moral issues of 
the post-war era. This material is of variable quality. With the majority of it being 
high on rhetoric, platitudes and ill-concealed disdain, proceed cautiously. It is also 
very difficult to find anyone today who admits to supporting apartheid then. Nor 
should everything that those involved in “the struggle” say after the fact, be taken at 
face value. African nationalism is a potent ideology that strongly resists external 
examination and criticism. Put more bluntly, the line of thought seems to be that if 
you are a victim you can do no wrong. Therefore, the motivation and ideology of all 
writers needs to be considered when examining this era. The ‘black and white’ 
picture of apartheid was towards the end phase becoming increasingly murky. What 
was in effect a three way dirty war – with the ANC as the main aggressors – meant 
that critics of apartheid were frequently embarrassed by revelations of wrongdoing 
and atrocities. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War meant that for the ANC’s 
                                                   
51 Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of a New 
South Africa, London and New York: W. W Norton and Company, 1997,  passim;  David 
Ottaway, Chained Together: Mandela, De Klerk and the Struggle to Remake South Africa, 
New York: Times Books, 1993, passim; Sebastian Mallaby, After Apartheid,  London and 
Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993, passim    
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critics the argument that apartheid, although far from ideal, was at least a bulwark 
against communism in Africa lost much of its force.  
 
Structure and Layout  
 
Chapter One contains an outline of the aftermath of the 1981 Springbok 
tour. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the fallout of the 1981 Springbok tour was 
not the catalyst for change within National as many still supported contact with 
South Africa and remained suspicious of the liberation movements. It was the 1984 
election that provided the catalyst for changing National’s approach towards South 
Africa.   
  The Muldoon government’s approach towards dealing with balancing the 
conflicting factions and commitments, and the problems this nationalistic stance 
posed for relations with the ‘third world’ and a number of other western countries 
needs to be seen against this backdrop. This needs to be set within the context of 
New Zealand perceptions of South Africa’s recent history. The main argument is 
that by following an increasingly outmoded and inadequate approach to handling 
South Africa and in particular sporting contacts New Zealand’s standing abroad 
was damaged. The ambiguous stance on South Africa increased the risk of harming 
the country’s chance of entering new markets in the developing world.    
Chapter Two covers the dramatic about face under the fourth Labour 
government and the worsening situation in southern Africa following the collapse 
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of Portugal’s African empire. The public reaction to the closure of the South 
African Consulate in Wellington and the opening of the New Zealand High 
Commission in Harare are both analysed. The impact of the mostly negative 
perception of the Botha government in South Africa at the time and the increasingly 
militant attitude of the liberation parties also had a great impact on the thinking of 
New Zealand policy makers.  
Chapter Three will cover the Bolger government, the modernisation of the 
National party and the move away from its previous Africa policy. The terrain it 
faced had changed from that of the previous National government, apartheid had 
been dismantled, and the Cold War was over. The New Zealand domestic 
environment had also changed. The precarious and uncertain nature of 
developments in South Africa, along with pessimistic reports from Harare meant 
that this reset was not a foregone conclusion. Also covered is the resumption of 
sporting contacts, a very brief overview of the main social and economic changes in 
South Africa that made the transition from apartheid to majority rule possible along 
with a brief overview of South African internal politics of the period.     
The structure of these chapters is overall chronological, with some thematic 
excursions.    
 
The Last Word 
 
35 
 
    
In a topic as fraught and sensitive as apartheid and as recent New Zealand 
history is open to interpretation, personal influences have a major bearing. 
Therefore, I want to conclude my introduction by explaining my own background 
and how I came to this topic. I was born in 1989, apartheid came to an effective end 
when I was a toddler and therefore what has been for most historians current events 
was and is for myself history. Having lived in Africa (Tanzania) as a child for 
around 18 months, I have always been interested in the recent history of Africa; a 
curiosity that was magnified by almost inevitable diet of Springbok tests and cricket 
tours that often forms part of the mental wallpaper of a Kiwi upbringing. Having 
once lived in a country that was ruled along the lines that the ANC would have 
pursued if they had come to power before the end of the Cold War I am less willing 
to buy into the anti-apartheid propaganda that colours the understanding of the era. 
The same is true of having been born after the 1981 Springbok tour. Age I feel, 
gives me a greater objectivity than those who have lived through it. I am still 
convinced that apartheid was not only deeply morally wrong but also foolish and 
self-defeating, but I can now see that South Africa’s alternatives were not much 
better. I have also come to see that the potential courses for action that the New 
Zealand government, Labour or National, were able to take over South Africa were 
not as simple as they would first appear. More often than not in history, what can 
seem simple and clear-cut, ‘black and white’ even, are usually anything but.       
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Chapter One: The 1981 Springbok Tour, its Aftermath, and its Impact on the 
1981-1984 National Government.  
 
Leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, 
materialism, and related ideologies…black racism, 
exaggerated individual freedom, one-man one-
vote…boycotts, isolation, demonstrations…undermining 
activities and limited violence.  
 
South African Government, White Paper on Defence and 
Arms Production 1973. Quoted in Alexander Johnston, 
“Weak States and National Security.”   
 
One, two, three, four!  
We don’t want your racist tour!  
 
A popular 1981 Springbok Tour protest slogan. Quoted in 
1981: Country at War 2003.    
 
 
The 1981 Springbok tour and its immediate aftermath is the context for 
examining the foreign policy thinking of the National Party of the early 1980s and 
the impact this had on New Zealand’s international standing in the years 1981-
1984. In this chapter, there are two opposing questions to be answered. To what 
extent did traditional ideas of ‘kith and kin’, the perceived failure of sanctions in 
Rhodesia, and the Cold War in southern Africa, along with the attempts at 
liberalisation in South Africa, give the New Zealand government reason to ‘back 
pedal’ on distancing themselves from the South African government of the time? 
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Alternatively, were differing opinions of ministers and officials weighted towards 
being prepared to ‘pull the plug’ on South Africa? Secondary to this is the question 
of how much influence the aftermath of the 1981 debacle had compared to the 
perceived preparations of international capital to disinvest from South Africa as the 
sustainability and stability of the regime looked less certain than it once had.         
 
Touchdown in Auckland  
 
On 19 July 1981 a South African Airways jet carrying the Springboks 
touched down at Auckland International Airport for the South African rugby 
football team’s first tour to New Zealand in over a decade. All Black – Springbok 
tours were the pinnacle of world rugby in the twentieth century; whoever won had 
the right to style themselves unofficial world champions. For fans in New Zealand, 
this tour had an added meaning; the All Blacks had lost the last series - played in 
South Africa - in 1976 and it was payback time. For the South African Rugby 
Football Union and the South African government, the fact the tour was happening 
at all was a major triumph. They may have been pariahs with a paralyzed economy 
and rebellious population, but they could still enjoy some rugby against their old 
rivals, yet friends, the Kiwis.  
Not everyone shared the enthusiasm. While the rugby fans were waiting 
with anticipation, many others looked on with revulsion. The tour was, for these 
opponents, not only an endorsement of the South African government’s policy of 
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apartheid; it was a betrayal of what New Zealand as a country stood for. For others 
the tour was a chance to draw attention to the poor treatment of non-Pakeha in New 
Zealand, and for some, a yelp of protest against the privileged status rugby enjoyed 
in New Zealand society and the macho-chauvinist values it represented. 1 
During the weeks that followed, protests and riots raged up and down a 
country that was, to John Carlin, “ordinarily one of the most politically placid 
countries in the world.” 2 Anti-apartheid groups were able to force the cancellation 
of one Springbok game against Waikato following an occupation of the pitch by a 
group of seminary students. The police were dispatched to save the protesters from 
assault by the angry crowd. This was the Springboks being stopped, not a team of 
Rhodesian “easy beats.”3 These scenes carried on in much the same fashion until 
the last test match at Auckland’s Eden Park, which was to the amazement of 
observers, interrupted by protesters dressed as clowns, a light plane dropping flour 
bombs on the players on the field below. It was, in effect, a full-scale street battle 
between protesters, the police, and a number of local hooligans just outside the 
grounds. 4  
                                                   
1 James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History Of The New Zealanders, From The 1880s To 
The Present, Auckland: Allan Lane, 2001, pp. 516-519; Geoff Fougere, “Sport, Culture and 
Identity: The Case of Rugby Football” in, Culture And Identity In New Zealand ed. David 
Novitz and Bill Willmott Wellington: GP Books, 1989, pp. 110-122          
2 John Carlin, Invictus: Nelson Mandela And The Game That Made A Nation, London: 
Atlantic Books, 2008, pp. 64-65   
3 Belich, pp. 517-518 
4 1981: A Country At War, dir. Rachel Jean and Owen Hughes, Frame Up Films, 2003. The 
author’s mother recalls that when she was visiting a house on one of the streets leading to 
Eden Park, protesters threw a firebomb at the foundations of the house. The resulting fire 
was easily extinguished with stomping. Gillian Peacock, conversation with author, 
18/08/2013.       
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The 1981 Springbok Tour polarised New Zealand in a manner that had not 
been seen since the 1951 waterfront dispute, left the courts backed up with unheard 
cases for over a year, split families, and was both a serious blow to the prestige of 
New Zealand rugby and most importantly to New Zealand’s international 
reputation. 5 The international opprobrium that resulted was met by the sitting 
government with defiance, even contempt. There were a number of institutional and 
cultural factors at work, but the unwillingness of the Prime Minister, Robert 
Muldoon, to change course once he had made up his mind on a certain matter, was 
of crucial importance. All of the above served to reinforce the image of New 
Zealand as a redneck backwater and worse an ally of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. The negative impact this had on New Zealand’s international reputation 
cannot be underestimated. To take one example, it almost certainly cost the country 
a two year term on the UN Security Council in 1982.6 This effect on New Zealand’s 
international reputation and the approaches and attitudes of the National party 
towards South Africa are the focus of this chapter.   
The 1981 Springbok Tour is problematic for a historian as there is limited 
academic analysis on the causes and effects of the debacle. It would be misleading 
to suggest that it was unimportant, a ‘storm in a teacup’. It was not. The effects of 
                                                   
5 More detailed accounts of the 1981 Springbok tour and its aftermath can be found in 
Carlin pp. 64-67;  Hugh Templeton, All Honourable Men: Inside The Muldoon Cabinet 
1975-1984 Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995, pp. 158-163; Malcolm Templeton, 
Human Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand Attitudes to Race Relations in South 
Africa 1921-1994, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998,  pp. 178-290;  Malcolm 
Mclean “Football As Social Critique: Protest Movements, Rugby And History In Aotearoa, 
New Zealand” in The International Journal Of  The History Of Sport, Vol. 17 No. 2-3, 
(2007), pp. 255-277;  Redmer Yska “The Tour Files” in The New Zealand Listener, 9-15 
July 2011,  pp. 14-20.      
6 Templeton, Human Rights, pp. 214-215  
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the 1981 Springbok Tour within New Zealand may have been exaggerated, but the 
international impact was undeniable.7 Prompted in part by the political and 
economic climate of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the protests both for and 
against the ill-fated tour were intense and sometimes brutal. It was, in retrospect, 
fortunate that nobody was killed in the protests, as this was always a real 
possibility.8  
The divisions and damage that the 1981 Springbok Tour left in its wake are 
hard to minimise. 9 It is one of history’s ironies that overall it may have been better 
in the long run that the 1981 Springbok tour was allowed to go ahead instead of 
being cancelled, as the reaction it generated seemed to negate the problems of 
allowing an overwhelmingly white, with the exception of  Errol Tobias, Springbok 
team to tour New Zealand. What made the passions of the 1981 Springbok tour so 
intense was the fact that for many in New Zealand, South Africa and apartheid was 
a proxy battle for New Zealand’s own problems and tensions regarding the Treaty 
of Waitangi and racism against Maori and Pasifika Peoples. 10  
Prime Minister Robert Muldoon’s motivations for allowing the tour to go 
ahead in spite of the opposition that it would provoke seem based on both principle 
and opportunism. As a matter of principle, Muldoon believed that governments 
                                                   
7 Carlin, Invictus, pp. 64-65   
8 Matthew Wright, Fantastic Pasts: Imaginary Adventures in New Zealand History, 
Auckland: Penguin Books, 2007, pp. 215-227 
9 1981: A Country At War ; Templeton,  Human Rights,  pp. 178-203; Belich, pp. 516-519; 
King, p. 485  
10 Richards, passim; Belich, pp. 516-519; Michael King The Penguin History of New 
Zealand  Auckland: Penguin Books 2003 pp. 485-499     
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should not interfere with sporting bodies and their decisions.11 Opportunistically, 
there was a need to shore up support in the rural regions ahead of the election later 
that year. 12 If this was the case, the Springbok tour served its purpose – National 
won the 1981 election, although only in a number of marginal seats and lost in 
terms of the party vote.13 Muldoon’s biographer Barry Gustafson attempts to make 
a case for Muldoon being forced into a fait accompli in allowing the tour to go 
ahead, the blame being on the NZRFU. 14 Gustafson’s case is not entirely 
convincing. Muldoon was willing to take the risk of allowing the 1981 Springbok 
Tour to go ahead, although not as much as later commentators have attempted to 
claim. 15 The fact that Muldoon placed a de facto ban on the New Zealand Olympic 
team, following the example of the Americans, attending the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, shows selective 
commitment to the autonomy of New Zealand’s sporting bodies. This is the best 
proof that the decision to allow the Springboks to tour New Zealand in 1981 was a 
political decision.  
Muldoon was not as eager to allow the tour to go ahead as left-wing 
demonology would have us believe. There were a number of mitigating factors 
including Muldoon’s unwillingness to repeat Norman Kirk’s 1973 mistake and 
                                                   
11 Barry Gustafson His Way: A Biography Of Robert Muldoon Auckland: Auckland 
University Press 2000 pp. 231-236, 309-321;Templeton, All Honourable Men, passim; Jon 
Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership, Wellington: Dunmore Publishing, 
2005,  pp. 66-68       
12 Templeton, All Honourable Men, pp. 153-164      
13 Johansson,  pp. 66-68    
14 Gustafson , His Way, pp. 309-321   
15 Belich, p. 517; Templeton, Human Rights, p. 202; Templeton, All Honourable Men, pp. 
158-159 
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renege on a campaign promise. The decision made sense, based on Muldoon and 
National’s internal foreign policy logic. The tour was nonetheless a grave error that 
would dog both National and Muldoon for many years to come. The final 
responsibility was with the NZRFU. This was their decision and they were in a 
better position to stop the tour than the government.      
It is not surprising that if such unofficial influence could affect an (albeit 
widely supported) boycott of the Olympics, then it was reasonable to assume that 
such influence could be brought into play to stop the 1981 Springbok tour of New 
Zealand. John Minto of HART, writing to Jim McLay, the then Attorney General 
and justice minister of New Zealand stressed that…  
 
…in your role as Minister of Justice and Attorney General, you are in an ideal 
position to take the necessary steps to prevent the breakdown of law and order 
and massive upheaval of our society which must result from the New Zealand 
Rugby Football Union’s selfish invitation to the South Africans. In light of 
your saying government should not act to stop the tour, we wonder whether 
you are therefore prepared to accept responsibility for any serious breaches of 
peace resulting from the tour and for any deaths or injuries that may occur 
during protests. Clearly, if you will not accept responsibility to stop this tour, 
you must accept personal responsibility for the breakdown of law and order in 
our society. 16                 
 
McLay replied that since HART were expecting violence, the government would in 
that case hold HART responsible for any of the problems or disorders that 
                                                   
16 ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 1 “Republic of South Africa: Social Affairs  
- Apartheid H.A.R.T [Halt All Racist Tours] [09/80-11/82]”  1980-1982    
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followed, and that such a line of thinking was “…a serious challenge to the rule of 
law which I could not condone.” 17 McLay, and National, stuck to their guns and 
the tour went ahead. National were able to turn the problems of the 1981 tour in to a 
law and order issue, a plausible interpretation given the strident attitude of the 
protest groups, as Minto’s quote illustrates.        
Muldoon, unlike his successor David Lange, did not hold the portfolio of 
Foreign Affairs; he retained considerable influence over a subject that was strongly 
tied to his chief priority, the New Zealand economy, through his choice of foreign 
ministers. 18   It seems that Warren Cooper got the job due to his business 
experience and personal qualities. However, Muldoon’s own personality was also 
an important factor in the maintenance of an increasingly controversial policy on 
South Africa. Chris Laidlaw, a critic of Muldoon, would in Rights of Passage, leave 
a vivid description of the man,   
 
My first of numerous encounters with Rob Muldoon was in Paris in 1976. 
Before then I had only seen him at receptions for the All Blacks and had been 
struck then by the bristling machismo of this strange little man. He had 
seemed to be a political variation on the theme of Grant Batty:19 small, stunted 
and radiating a single message to all around him” “don’t mess with me or I’ll 
punch your lights out.”20  
 
                                                   
17 ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 1  
18 Johansson, pp. 66-68  
19 Grant Batty – a diminutive, but effective, All Black wing from 1972-1977.  
20 Chris Laidlaw, Rights of Passage: Beyond the New Zealand Identity Crisis, Auckland: 
Hodder Beckett Moa 1999 pp. 101-102 
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Laidlaw then conceded that, of course, Muldoon was far more multi-dimensional 
than that, and that:   
 
He was known and respected for his ability to grasp the detail of a brief. He 
was admired by Treasury and Foreign Affairs staff, at least in his early days as 
Finance Minister, for his mastery of essential economic policy and for his 
pugnacious determination. He was brilliant but he was flawed with what 
seemed to be an ugly chip on his shoulder. 21         
 
Laidlaw was also convinced that Muldoon’s bad reputation and personal 
characteristics outlined above were the main reasons for New Zealand’s increasing 
isolation in the Commonwealth and UN in the early 1980s. The fallout of the 1981 
tour in the short term was a hardening of attitudes toward the anti-apartheid lobby 
within the National Party. This in turn increased the protesters’ antagonism towards 
the government and it seems they were convinced that they were becoming victims 
of a campaign of political persecution.  
It says a great deal for how much Muldoon’s personality dominated his 
government, that many often overlook the presence of Foreign Minister Warren 
Cooper. Cooper often derided by both former colleagues and later commentators 
for his rural background and lack of polish that is frequently deemed a prerequisite 
for the foreign affairs portfolio. 22 Others have, highlighted Cooper’s easy-going 
personality, dry wit and level-headed pragmatism, while still expressing surprise at 
                                                   
21 Laidlaw, Rights of Passage,  pp. 101-102  
22 Templeton, All Honourable Men, pp. 166-167; Dr Jim McAloon, conversation with 
author, 24/01/2012. Hugh Templeton however admits in his memoir that he had been 
angling for the foreign affairs portfolio.       
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the choice of a proverbial ‘Dark Horse’. 23  However, Cooper’s letters to members 
of the public in New Zealand on the subject would suggest that the former 
assessment is not too far off the mark. In response to Alfred Ruffell dated 7 January 
1983, Cooper states that he,  
 
…make[s] no apology for taking exception to HARTs description of the 
government of New Zealand as “outright racist” and appeal[s] to the 
Organisation of African Unity to make every effort “to force the Government 
to change its policy on apartheid” as well as to enforce sanctions against New 
Zealand. These and other statements reported in the African newspapers give a 
completely false and damaging impression of New Zealand. 24     
 
The following dénouement from the foreign minister Warren Cooper on 12 
November 1982, in response to allegations that the government was keeping 
“political prisoners” following the 1981 Springbok tour,   
 
The latest act of lying propaganda by New Zealanders Yvonne Cuthbert and 
Trevor Richards of HART is part of calculated international smear campaign 
aimed at sabotaging this country’s good name abroad…without a shred of 
concern for the country of their birth these mischievous people are squeezing 
every last drop of bad odium from a rugby tour fifteen months past. It is 
ironical that they cannot recognise that such comments would not be tolerated 
in many countries where they would indeed, through such an approach, 
rapidly become political prisoners. The latest blatant untruths show just how 
desperate and despicable the leaders of HART have become. It is difficult 
enough unravelling the odd remaining misconceptions as the tour fades 
                                                   
23 Gustafson, His Way, p. 322; Templeton,  Human Rights, pp. 205-209       
24 ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 2 “Republic of South Africa: Social Affairs  
- Apartheid H.A.R.T [Halt All Racist Tours] [12/82-07/85]” 1982-1985 Archives New 
Zealand Central Office Wellington. 
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without HART’s pusillanimous and weird distortions. They would be doing 
many New Zealanders a favour if they chose to remain overseas for an 
indefinite period.25    
 
A fortnight prior to this statement, the same “mischievous people” had alleged to 
the UN Special Committee against Apartheid (UNSCAA) that the (New Zealand) 
government was holding a number of “political prisoners,” and the UNSCAA in 
turn issued a message of concern to the New Zealand government. These “political 
prisoners” were in fact a number of protesters being held on misdemeanour charges 
whose cases were still being processed through the overburdened court system. 
This led to a public rebuttal of the charges by the chief justice Sir Thomas 
Eichelbaum, who dismissed such talk as “…completely irrelevant” and maintained 
that the law and judiciary was impartial to political persuasion. 26  The official line 
of the ministry secretary M.J.C Templeton27 advised placing the allegations in their 
context and expressed a hope that the committee would be discerning in their 
judgement of the letter. 28  
The official public tough line, in contrast to Templeton’s recommendations, 
was for domestic consumption and was part of an attempt to shore up the support 
base of National as an election approached. The government believed they had the 
right to be angry over the false allegations; their hard-line response caused a great 
deal of offence abroad. 
                                                   
25 ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 1 The statement referred to the attempts to 
exclude New Zealand from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.     
26 ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 1  
27 Malcolm Templeton, the author of Human Rights and Sporting Contacts.     
28ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 1  
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Like the 1976 All Blacks tour of South Africa, the 1981 Springbok tour of 
New Zealand had implications beyond the immediate context of New Zealand 
domestic politics or global indignation at apartheid. Recently released Australian 
government papers show that the Australian government was considering banning 
New Zealand from the 1982 Brisbane Commonwealth Games, to prevent a mass 
boycott of African nations as had happened at both the 1976 Montreal Olympics 
and 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth games respectively. 29  Muldoon himself 
became an increasingly disliked figure on the international stage, and as the most 
well-known New Zealand politician up until the emergence of David Lange, this 
was bound to reflect badly on New Zealand abroad. Indeed, Chris Laidlaw 
considers that Muldoon might have been even more disliked than Margaret 
Thatcher might at Commonwealth meetings and other international forums during 
this period. 30     
 
Rhodesia and Sanctions: Lessons for the National Party.     
 
Although tangential to the topic of New Zealand’s foreign policy on South 
Africa, the problems posed by UDI Rhodesia, were, especially for National, a factor 
in decision making on South Africa and the two were seen rightly or wrongly as 
being analogous. Even if there was no direct reference to Rhodesia in official 
                                                   
29 Natalie Finnigan “Explosive Relations” in New Zealand Listener June 16-22 2012  pp. 
21-23   
30 Laidlaw, Rights of Passage, pp. 103-105  
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thinking, it was always there in the background. The actions taken by the New 
Zealand government over the Rhodesia crisis in the 1960s and 1970s had a great 
impact on the thinking of those setting policy on South Africa in the 1980s and 
1990s not only in New Zealand, but also in many other countries as well.  
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the later civil war 
were different from the long drawn out affair of apartheid in South Africa, but there 
were enough similarities to make comparison between the two plausible. Both were 
regimes that were holding a tenuous grip on power and were clearly floundering in 
their attempts to find a way out of the impasses in which they found themselves. 
Fearing the ‘calamitous effects’ of majority rule and having an understandable 
desire to hold on to power, the minority government of what was then called 
Southern Rhodesia31 illegally rebelled from British rule and declared independence 
in 1965. In spite of the protestations to the contrary, this was an attempt to avoid 
having to go along with the British government’s policy of NIBMAR. The reaction 
was predictably one of indignation and fury. Sanctions were soon applied, but these 
were on a voluntary and not mandatory basis and in any case were often ignored. 
Eventually, protest spilled into a civil war in the 1970s that would drag on until the 
UK- supported Lancaster House talks and the eventual creation of modern day 
Zimbabwe in 1980.  
                                                   
31 Southern Rhodesia, so called to differentiate it from what was until 1964 Northern 
Rhodesia, that is, today’s Zambia.   
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It is therefore not surprising that many influential business leaders and 
politicians became convinced that sanctions did not work, did more harm than good 
and that there might be a better approach to dealing with wayward states. This 
belief was indeed stronger regarding South Africa than it had been with Rhodesia. 
New Zealand observers were not the only ones to see parallels between Rhodesia 
and South Africa. William Minter and Elizabeth Schmidt in a 1988 article for the 
journal African Affairs “When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Re-
examined”, 32 reviewed the nature of economic sanctions and both the manner in 
which they were imposed and their effects. According to Minter and Schmidt, 
sanctions need time to work and often do, but do not sustain the short-term benefits 
associated with stimulating domestic industry. 33 “Some people feel that sanctions 
failed…I think they failed initially…but in the long term they exercised a very 
important element…certainly they did not help” was what one Zimbabwean 
businessman had to say of the effect of sanctions in the 1980s. 34  
As was the case with South Africa, there was the question of the effect of 
sustained war on the economy. In particular, the removal from the work force of 
able-bodied young men and the issue of political will.35 The most powerful effects 
of sanctions are their psychological effects. This in the end was the real effect of 
sanctions in South Africa. The impact of the material consequences of sanctions at 
                                                   
32 William Minter and Elizabeth Schmidt, “When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia 
Re-examined” in African Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 347, (April 1988),  pp. 207-237     
33 Ibid, pp. 208-209  
34 Anonymous interview with Elizabeth Schmidt in, ibid, p. 208  
35 Ibid, pp. 207-237 
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first could be a nuisance and ways could be found around them. Eventually the 
constant subterfuge, dirty looks when overseas, shoddy local goods in the stores 
and the growing violence were in the end too much for most white South Africans. 
Soon it was accepted that something, anything had to be done to get out of the 
situation. This more than anything was proof that sanctions worked. This conviction 
was not universally held by all in the New Zealand, government or abroad.             
 
The “Total Strategy” and South Africa’s Security Dilemma.    
 
South Africa in the early 1980s was a country that was divided and facing a 
number of major existential threats from both without and within. A product of the 
civil war that followed Portugal’s Carnation Revolution and Angola’s independence 
in 1975 was the presence of some 30,000 Cuban troops and a large cache of Soviet 
weaponry and vehicles in Angola. This sense of siege was the main factor behind 
the Laager mentality. 36 The various black nationalist parties and their military 
wings were being armed and supplied by a variety of Eastern Bloc states. This was 
a problem for New Zealand politicians who were keen to keep groups that were 
under normal definitions terrorists at a polite distance, but support for these groups 
was a component of a number of UN resolutions on apartheid in the period. 37    
                                                   
36 Robert Service, Comrades. Communism: A World History, London: Pan Books, 2007, p. 
410. It is worth noting that South Africa and the USA were also supplying men and 
weapons in the Angolan Civil War, a conflict that would not end until 2002.    
37 Templeton, Human Rights, pp. 251-252  
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The perception of South Africa as an increasingly authoritarian 
government, determined on pursuing an aggressive foreign policy to attempt to 
prop up its illegitimate domestic regime, was a widely held one. It is this perception 
that explains why for many years, there were those who were willing to ignore 
many of the excesses of the liberation movements. These excesses being the rule of 
terror in the townships, the bombing, and sabotage campaigns in the cities and the 
appalling condition in the guerrilla armies training camps in Angola and 
elsewhere.38  
During the period, most New Zealand politicians and much of the public 
took the malevolent intentions of the South African police and army as read. The 
fact that the South African police and army were often engaged in shocking and 
deplorable acts of violence is beyond doubt; but to what extent this was due to 
simple malevolence, or to the fact the police were under staffed, over worked and 
used as political scapegoats is open to debate. It needs to be said that in the 1980s 
over half the South African police and much of the South African armed forces in 
this period were non-white, thus throwing into question the old “defending white 
privilege” canard as well as lending weight to the anti-communist interpretation of 
the unrest of the 1980s. 39 However, there were those in New Zealand who, without 
condoning the excess of the Nationalists, were distrustful of the liberation 
movements, because of the perceived communist influence. It is not surprising, 
                                                   
38 Johnson, The First Man, pp. 168-172  
39 Deon Fourie, “The New South Africa and the Armed Forces” in, South Africa: Designing 
New Institutions ,ed. Murray Faure and Jan-Erik Lane,  London, Thousand Oaks and New 
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therefore, that there were still many within the New Zealand government in the 
early 1980s who preferred a policy of sitting on the fence that was too often 
misinterpreted as support for Pretoria. 
Another widely held misconception about apartheid is the perception that it 
was a hangover of colonialism. White rule in UDI Rhodesia was a hangover of 
colonialism, apartheid in South Africa was not. Apartheid as colonial hangover is in 
fact a profound misunderstanding of the nature of Afrikaner nationalism and its 
interaction with both ‘dominion nationalism’ and, more importantly, African 
nationalism. The African nationalist parties in South Africa were historically 
anglophone and anglophile, as most of their leaders had been educated by British 
missionaries and in English medium schools. This cultural and educational 
influence explains in part the strong anti-Afrikaner bias in their thinking. This 
anglophone influence is important as it meant that African nationalism was able, 
due to its superior command of English in comparison with its Afrikaner rivals, to 
make their case on the international stage, and in New Zealand, more effectively 
and with greater success.   
African nationalism in South Africa is treated as if it existed in a vacuum or 
was simply a victim of the two forces of British imperialism and Afrikaner 
nationalism. This is both wrong and insulting to black South Africans. Post-colonial 
approaches to history of former colonial states can be enlightening; there are also 
important intellectual limitations. These post-colonial analyses often 
unintentionally deny agency and in more extreme cases end up falling for many of 
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the clichés and traps that colour older imperial accounts. The idea that there was a 
deliberate plan to bring the series of laws and policies that we have come to call 
apartheid into being is one such trap. Apartheid was guided by clear ideas and 
principle, but there was no plan. It would seem that apartheid was a remarkably 
haphazard affair, with major aspects of government policy often being made up on 
the hoof. To be fair, this was the standard view of apartheid until recently within the 
academy. It is not surprising that it would also prevail in the mind of the public and 
the politicians in New Zealand.          
  
The problems with law and order were not the only misconceptions about 
South Africa that were commonly held in New Zealand. South Africa’s geostrategic 
dilemma was overlooked. Apartheid contributed to South Africa’s security 
problem, although it was not the sole factor. The root of the South African 
government’s dilemma was that South Africa was much more advanced and 
powerful than its neighbours. However to maintain this primacy, economic growth 
and internal security were vital. Apartheid contributed to this in that labour costs 
were kept low and anti-government dissent was kept under control. In the end, this 
did much to undermine the initial advantages that had been gained from having a 
fifty-year head start over the rest of Africa in the areas of economic development 
and industrialisation. In a wider context, despite the political troubles and economic 
hardships that were common in post-colonial Africa, progress was being made in 
many other African countries. The discovery of oil in a number of states, most 
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importantly Nigeria, South Africa’s only real competitor on the continent, meant 
that South Africa’s primacy was becoming increasingly hard to maintain. The twin 
problems of external challengers to South Africa’s status on the continent and their 
internal discontent, made breaking out of international isolation an urgent priority.   
Linked to the need to maintain South Africa’s standing in Africa against 
these rising regional challengers was the lack of membership in a major defence 
treaty. During most of the post war era South Africa was not party to one of the 
large American-led defence treaties such as NATO ( it was on the wrong side of the 
equator) or SEATO ( it was too far away from Asia) that were in vogue during the 
Cold War. South Africa being an official member of the broader “western alliance,” 
post Sharpeville was simply out of the question. Although there were attempts at 
rectifying the situation throughout the 1960s and 1970s, by proposals for a SATO 
(Southern Atlantic Treaty Organisation) with the Americans and a number of Latin 
American right-wing military dictatorships, and similar plans for a Southern 
Hemisphere Defence Alliance, nothing eventuated.40 There was a serious desire on 
the South African side to include New Zealand and a number of other countries in 
the southern hemisphere in these proposed alliances. Senior figures in the New 
Zealand government looked into this proposal with some interest. The alliance 
proposal was abandoned on the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as being 
too damaging to New Zealand’s international reputation to be in a full military 
                                                   
40 Klaus-John Dodds, “Creating a Strategic Crisis out of a Communist Drama? Argentine 
and South African Geographs of the South Atlantic” in, European Review of Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies, No. 56, (June 1994), pp. 33-54    
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alliance with South Africa during the 1960s-1970s, even if the geo-politics behind 
such an alliance were sound. 41 South Africa’s lack of membership in a major 
defence treaty and a group of reliable allies to fall back on was a major impediment 
to being able to solve its domestic problems satisfactorily. Adding to South Africa’s 
security problems, the attempts to reach out to the rest of Africa and other 
decolonised nations did not happen until it was far too late for it to make any 
substantial difference to South Africa’s poor reputation in the eyes of many. 42                 
From the 1960s onwards, it could be argued that South Africa was in a state 
of de facto civil war with the various Liberation movements; namely the ANC, the 
PAC, and AZAPO, which were to a greater or lesser extent being aided by 
neighbouring hostile African states, and indirectly, by the communist states. The 
cynical idea that South Africa’s poor image was partially the result of a conspiracy 
by the decolonised African states to draw attention away from their own internal 
problems is not true, but there is truth in it. For example, one of the most notorious 
aspects of the Nationalist’s policies was the forced removals to the Homelands. 
These types of forced resettlements were also practiced in other parts of Africa, 
Tanzania being the most notable example.43 The favouring of one ethnic group 
above others, although not as heavily entrenched in law as it was in South Africa, 
                                                   
41 Templeton, Human Rights, pp. 70-72   
42 For more information on South African foreign policy under Apartheid see James Barber 
and John Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search For Status and Security 1945-
1988, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, passim      
43 Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided 
Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991,  pp. 1-41    
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was common.44 This is not to excuse what was happening in South Africa during 
the era but places apartheid in its proper context. People of European descent do not 
have a monopoly on such behaviour and the action of black Ugandans towards their 
Asian population is an example. The constant worry about the Communist 
influence on the liberation movements was, in retrospect, a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Overall, the biggest contribution to South Africa’s security problems in the 1980s 
and early 1990s was that the legitimacy of the state became undermined to the point 
that it was unable to impose law and order or collect revenue effectively, but was 
not undermined to such a degree that it was going to collapse.45     
South Africa’s internal problems are fundamental to understanding a 
number of factors that were of great importance to New Zealand policy makers. 
The motivations of the Nationalists and the liberation movements, the origins of a 
number of important misconceptions and limitations that arose because of these 
problems, influenced the decisions of successive New Zealand governments and the 
attitudes of the New Zealand public.  
 
South Africa in New Zealand: The Role of the Consulate and Attempted Alliance 
Building.  
                                                   
44 ibid 
45  It was during this period that corruption and capital outflow began to reach 
unprecedented levels as both the homelands bureaucrats and civil servants of South Africa 
proper began to start embezzling state monies and became more bold in seeking bribes and 
kickbacks; a major factor in the weakening of morale in the Nationalist government. For 
more information see, Jonathan Hyslop, “Political Corruption: Before and After Apartheid” 
in, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, (December 2005),  pp. 773-789; and 
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New Zealand and South Africa had a common background as dominions of 
the British Empire and were on the same side in both World Wars and the Korean 
War. Despite this shared history, the New Zealand High Commission to South 
Africa would not open until 1996. A reciprocal South African High Commission to 
New Zealand would not open until 2009. There were a number of reasons for this 
lacuna. The lack of substantial bilateral trade, geography and differing political 
priorities meant that for New Zealand there was not much purpose in having a post 
in South Africa. The majority of New Zealand’s diplomatic energies were directed 
towards both Europe and Asia for trade, later extending into Latin America; or 
towards the South Pacific, as this was increasingly being seen by a number of 
policy makers in Wellington as New Zealand’s particular sphere of influence. 
South Africa on the other hand, for reasons of both national amour-propre 
and strategic political reasons, needed to win allies and friends in what the 
Nationalists perceived to be the ‘civilised world’. In particular, to maintain the 
goodwill of the Americans and other Western states as well as maintain their 
position in Africa. It is for these reasons that, despite the geographic incongruity 
and lack of justification on the grounds of trade, the South African government was 
convinced that it was worth the time and money to maintain a consular post in New 
Zealand. New Zealand being Western, ‘white’, anti-communist, so the logic went, 
would be sympathetic to (white) South Africa and its dilemma. The South African 
government had made a number of good assumptions. There were for a long time 
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many in New Zealand who were of the opinion that South Africa was not only a 
potential trade partner of some value but also an old ally and friend who should be 
maintained as a bastion against Communism and for ‘civilisation’ in Africa. This 
was the main thrust of the ‘kith and kin’ argument that was still holding sway in 
New Zealand’s National Party in 1981-1984. The ‘kith and kin’ argument 
dovetailed with the anti-communist argument. These twin conservative lines of 
thought were in 1981-1984 the underpinning of National’s foreign policy and 
therefore South Africa held a great attraction for many on the right, as both an ‘old 
friend’ and as a fellow ally against international communism.           
Before its closure in 1984, the South African Consulate was denounced by 
many in New Zealand as simply a base for the spreading of propaganda in support 
of the government in Pretoria. There was a South African Consul-General in New 
Zealand from 1966 until the last incumbent was withdrawn in 1984.Contrary to 
this, full diplomatic privileges were withheld from the Consulate, and there was no 
reciprocal presence of the New Zealand Foreign Service in South Africa.  It was for 
this reason that most business involving visas was handled via the South African 
embassy in Canberra, (South Africa’s full posts in the Commonwealth were 
referred to as Embassies and not High Commission due to the fact that between 
1961 and 1994, South Africa was not a member of the Commonwealth). The South 
African government’s plans for both a trading bloc and a defence alliance were 
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other reasons for the presence of the South African Consulate in New Zealand for 
much of the period. 46   
 
Nonetheless, for much of the 1960s and 1970s, most government ministers 
were tolerant of the various Consul-Generals and were often accepting of their 
hospitality. 47 This tolerance extended to occasions when diplomatic protocol was 
breached, notably in 1980 in the case of a number of pro-South Africa letters 
written to a variety of newspapers ostensibly from New Zealand authors but in fact 
produced on the South African Consulate’s typewriter on official letterhead. 48 
South Africa was not the only country with a bad reputation with presence in New 
Zealand. A number of other nations with questionable reputations such as Iran, the 
Soviet Union, and Argentina prior to the overthrow its military dictatorship, and 
Saudi Arabia, all had consular representation in New Zealand in this period. Indeed, 
the Soviet embassy was suspected of donating illegally to a variety of communist-
affiliated parties in New Zealand but the Soviet embassy itself was never closed 
down.  
The South African Consulate did in fact carry out government business and 
work that was not of a suspicious nature. Examples include dealing with meat and 
dairy exports and animal hygiene regulations, censorship of films destined for film 
                                                   
46 Barber and Barrett,  p. 156  
47 Templeton, Human Rights, pp. 219-220. Templeton notes that the Vorster Government 
requested that Muldoon open a New Zealand Embassy in Pretoria in 1975, Muldoon refused 
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festivals in South Africa, and attempting to deal with the problem of pirated New 
Zealand films in circulation in South Africa. 49 The Consulate in Wellington was 
not only a base for its staff to maintain links and attempt to influence New Zealand 
government ministers and members of parliament; it was also used for facilitating 
trade and social links. The amount of trade between New Zealand and South Africa 
was in terms of revenue for both nations quite small. This trade was in influential 
sectors such as the meat and dairy industry. Dairy and meat exports to South Africa 
could be lucrative in times of drought, as can be gleaned from the correspondence 
of the South African Consulate as well as that from the New Zealand Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and the South African Agriculture Department.50 The 
letters in the file mainly concern the exports of meat products to South Africa and 
such matters as animal hygiene and export regulations. Later, there were circulars 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade attempting to determine and 
monitor which aspects of this trade needed to be suspended to comply with the 
government sanctions obligations.51 Other issues influencing trade included the 
shipping unions refusal to work with goods being imported from South Africa, and 
Customs concerns about computer exports and whether these exports were aiding 
and abetting the regime. 52             
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The Potential for a New Zealand Diplomatic Post in Africa. 
 
The other side of the widely held misconceptions about South Africa in 
New Zealand were the equally widely held misconceptions about New Zealand in 
decolonised Africa. The motivations and intent of the New Zealand government 
were often misunderstood by much of decolonised Africa because political and 
diplomatic decisions were made and conveyed via third parties, such as the African 
Embassies and High Commissions in Canberra, Ottawa, or London; the New York 
and Geneva Permanent Missions of the UN; and, the Commonwealth office in 
London. Unsurprisingly, matters often got “lost in translation” and wires were 
crossed since there were no New Zealand diplomatic posts in Africa until the 
opening of the Harare High Commission in Zimbabwe in 1986. Given the hostility 
that much of decolonised Africa felt for South Africa under apartheid, the South 
African Consulate in Wellington was in no position to fill the function of a go-
between. New Zealand was not the only country to have these problems regarding 
the Republic. The general habit of the western governments of keeping the South 
African government at arm’s length was common (with the exception of Portugal 
prior to the Carnation Revolution of 1974.) The idea was far from universally 
accepted, and was widely criticised on the grounds of cost and practicality. The 
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suggestion of a diplomatic post in Africa was attractive to many. Harare was seen 
as the best option.53 
Africa’s relative lack of importance for those in government circles is 
reflected in the New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review (NZFAR) from October 1981 
until March 1984. The amount of space given to African affairs is much smaller 
than that given to regions considered more important for New Zealand such as 
Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific. The majority of entries focus on the 
question of sporting contacts as opposed to questions over possibilities of trade or 
building strategic diplomatic contacts. 54 In light of the then government’s 
priorities, this was not surprising. The New Zealand National Party had historically 
placed its emphasis on trading partners and not on the more moralistic side of 
international relations. The lack of emphasis on Africa was also reflected in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal arrangements. There was only one desk for 
Africa and that desk was also responsible for covering the Middle East. In practice, 
the growing importance of the Middle East for New Zealand’s meat and dairy 
exports in this period meant that Africa did not feature highly on the ministry’s list 
of priorities. In any case, Africa for New Zealand policy makers meant anglophone 
Africa, and the Commonwealth desk at the ministry managed it. Nonetheless, given 
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the growing public furore over South Africa, there was a need for a coherent 
strategy on both apartheid and decolonised Africa, as it was becoming clear that the 
traditional approach was not working.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Many New Zealand politicians and policy makers were alarmed by the 
escalating violence and disappointed by the perceived failure of sanctions in 
Rhodesia. A group of ministers and officials who stood by the interlocking 
arguments of ‘kith and kin’ and anti-communism were the people persuaded by the 
attempts at reform in South Africa. They retained the conviction that even if South 
Africa had problems, this was not a reason to abandon what had the potential to be 
a useful relationship.  
However, despite the strong pull of anti-communism and older imperial 
ties, there were those in government who were becoming convinced that South 
Africa was not worth the trouble, but that being seen to be supportive of them was 
also damaging New Zealand’s standing abroad, with potentially calamitous 
consequences for trade and the economy. This change in attitudes was not dramatic. 
The traditional approach of abstention and cautious neutrality that the New Zealand 
government took on apartheid was not tacit support for that regime; although it did 
look like it to many both within and outside New Zealand. These mistaken views 
made dealing with the fallout of decisions taken by private groups like the NZRFU 
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harder to address as the New Zealand governments motivations were open to 
negative interpretations. The other side of this was the erroneous views of South 
Africa, and indeed Africa in general, that were widely held by the politicians and 
much of the public in New Zealand. These views of South Africa as a potential 
military dictatorship had some influence in government circles. The fear over 
communist influence in the liberation movements frequently overrode distaste for 
the Nationalists, but only just. The anger the 1981 Springbok tour generated left 
many entrenched in their convictions, but also changed the minds of an equal 
number.                
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Chapter Two: The Botha and Lange Administrations, 1985-1989  
 
…I am writing to congratulate your decision to close the South African 
Consulate. The Consulate served no useful purpose in this country…It is 
freshing[sic] to know that we at last have a government which is prepared to 
do something other than simply express its abhorrence of the apartheid 
policies practiced in South Africa. I look forward to the early opening of a 
diplomatic post in Africa as this is long overdue… 
 
Letter to David Lange regarding the closure of the South African Consulate 
August 1984     
 
The strategies of the fourth Labour government and the particular 
importance of David Lange in his dual capacity as both prime and foreign minister 
for the years 1984-1987, outwardly involved a major shift in New Zealand’s 
handling of South Africa. The stance taken towards South Africa in the period, with 
emphasis on the perceptions of the intentions of the Botha government, was 
negative. This had a significant impact on the decision to pursue sanctions more 
vigorously.  
 
The closure of the South African Consulate and the opening of the New 
Zealand High Commission in Harare are the main events of this period, along with 
the case of Finnigan vs NZRFU and the 1986 Cavaliers tour. The closure of the 
South African Consulate in Wellington and the public reaction revealed a great deal 
about the variety of opinions and views of subject of South Africa. Following 
Labour’s election in 1984, the leaders of the anti-apartheid movement assumed that 
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Lange and his government would be sympathetic to their cause. This did not 
happen. The difference of opinion between the anti-apartheid movement and the 
sitting Labour government is frequently overlooked but was important as the two 
were often at odds over civil rights (for example, freedom of travel). This conflict 
explains much of the on-going antagonism between the New Zealand government 
and the protesters. These debates also filtered into the tension over the planned 
1985 All Blacks tour of South Africa, the case of Finnigan vs NZRFU, and the 
resulting Cavaliers tour of 1986. All these factors are discussed below, the 
overriding themes being the need for some sort of effective damage control 
following the disastrous Muldoon governments approach to South African 
relations, the conflicting demands of respecting the autonomy of civil society, and 
preventing potential international incidents, something that was easier said than 
done.     
 
1984: The State of the Nation and an Election.   
 
By 1984, it was obvious to most observers, both domestic and foreign, that 
South Africa was a country in trouble. President P.W Botha’s attempts at 
constitutional reform, in the form of the 1983 Constitution and Tricameral 
Parliament, had backfired in spectacular fashion. A gruesome wave of violence 
swept the country, with the ANC declaring a “people’s war” on the government, 
this in turn leading Prime Minister Botha to declare emergency rule in 1985, 
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producing cries in some quarters that South Africa was replacing a semi-
authoritarian racial oligarchy with a full-blown military dictatorship.1 Unrest in the 
townships surrounding most of the major towns and cities - Johannesburg, Pretoria, 
Vereeniging, Durban, and Port Elizabeth - had been common for much of the post 
war era; but this new round of unrest was different. Unlike the last major 
disturbances, of 1960 and 1976, the apartheid government in Pretoria, although still 
endowed with the will to suppress the unrest, was now not buffered by the 
Portuguese empire in Africa, white-ruled Rhodesia, and a world preoccupied with 
the Vietnam war. White South Africa’s chickens, it would seem, had come home to 
roost. 2  After Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, the 
threat of a Soviet-backed socialist regime in South Africa became less potent.   
Botha’s solution to finding the way out of the Verwoerdian stagnation that 
had hung over South African politics for the past two decades was the notorious 
and byzantine Tricameral Parliament and Constitution of 1983. The Tricameral 
parliament was a three-chambered house of parliament with one chamber a-piece 
for Whites, Indian, and Coloureds. It was assumed that Blacks would be politically 
represented in their ‘Native Homelands’. Since this arrangement excluded the 
                                                   
1 To what extent the military rather than the civilian government was in charge of policy 
during Botha’s tenure has been debated with one security expert writing in a liberal essay 
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South Africa and the Armed Forces” in, South Africa: Designing New Institutions, ed. 
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Homelands and Blacks living in the cities from formal citizenship and politics. It is 
no great surprise that the result was sustained unrest throughout much of the 
country. The Botha administration also repealed many laws, the most notable being 
the numerous petty segregation laws, and the Mixed Marriage and Immorality Acts 
that blighted the lives of many; it carried out a significant number of important 
reforms. But the Liberation movements in exile and members of the underground 
within South Africa (known as the ‘Inziles’) issued what was in effect a declaration 
of civil war with the intent of making South Africa ungovernable.  
The plan to do so involved a three-pronged attack. The first was a 
propaganda barrage and renewed sanctions to undermine what little credibility 
South Africa had abroad. The second was to use the newly legalised black trade 
unions within South Africa along with a number of civil society groups, known 
collectively as the UDF, to mobilise popular opposition to the government. The 
third, and most controversial, was a systematic campaign of attacks and 
assassinations targeted against the police, the armed forces and anyone who was 
perceived as collaborators with the regime, mainly the IFP and its followers and the 
rulers and officials of the Homelands. 3 South Africa in the 1980s was facing a 
number of very large problems and the options for solving them were seemingly 
running out. In retrospect the real threat to apartheid in South Africa came not from 
black discontent or white doubts; it came from the investors and businesses who 
                                                   
3 William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
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kept the regime afloat with cash and skills. As important as the protests and of 
social unrest in South Africa in this period was the decision of Chase Manhattan 
Bank to call in the government loans in 1985.4  This choice was not taken due to 
pressure from anti-apartheid groups but was a market based decision and a vote of 
no-confidence in Botha and his government. It is difficult to say to what extent the 
legitimacy issue the South African government faced contributed to Chase 
Manhattan’s decision, although it would be surprising if it played no role at all. 
Other commercial banks and several major companies followed suit, and decided to 
disinvest from South Africa. The result was a collapse in the value of the Rand and 
a threefold increase of the national debt almost overnight. 5  
South Africa, like New Zealand and most new world and periphery nations, 
was (and is) a net importer of capital and direct investment. This is the reason why 
Chase Manhattan’s decision to call in its loans was so important. Almost every 
major political crisis of the twentieth century in South Africa; the 1922 Rand 
Rebellion, the Great Depression and the beginning and end of apartheid had been 
preceded by an investment strike of one form or another, and on almost every 
occasion were followed by the collapse of the sitting government. 6 The efficacy of 
sanctions needs to be assessed in this context. Sanctions also would not only affect 
the Republic itself but a number of states in the southern African region that were 
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reliant on South Africa for trade and assistance. This was one of the reasons behind 
the reluctance to impose sanctions on South Africa.     
 
New Zealand under the Fourth Labour Government.   
 
Muldoon had faced problems with his younger MPs who were questioning 
his ability to lead. Following the sacking of one minister and two National MPs 
threating to ‘jump the Waka’ Muldoon called a snap election in July 1984. On what 
was one of the highest turnouts for a post-war New Zealand election, Labour won 
by a landslide, making David Lange the youngest prime minister to date. 7 The 
election of the fourth Labour government would have far-reaching consequences on 
the economy, social policy, the relationship between the state and society, and on 
foreign policy. This period is best remembered for the economic restructuring 
popularly known as “Rogernomics” in acknowledgement of the high profile of the 
then Finance Minister Roger Douglas. There were also a number of important 
social reforms such as the decriminalisation of homosexuality and recognition the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.8 The most well known foreign policy initiative 
of this government was the anti-nuclear policy directed towards both American 
nuclear ships and French weapons testing. The fourth Labour government’s policy 
                                                   
7James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders,  From the 1880s to the 
Year 2000,  Auckland: Allan Lane, 1998,  pp. 305-424;  Michael King, The Penguin History 
of New Zealand, Auckland: Penguin, 2003,  pp. 485-499   
8 King, pp. 485-499   
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on apartheid was also a major departure from earlier governments.9 South Africa 
was a major topic of conversation in New Zealand during the period under 
consideration. However, it was never a major policy issue in the same way as CER, 
nuclear testing, and the ANZUS alliance were in the period. 10 For its part, Pretoria 
had larger problems to worry about than cancelled sporting tours and the closure of 
a minor consular post. These problems included war in Angola, the status of 
Namibia, and the rebellion in the townships and homelands that almost brought the 
whole of South Africa and its economy to its knees.  
 
The Closure of the South African Consulate.   
 
In keeping with a promise made at the Labour Party conference during the 
election campaign, the Labour government made moves to close the South African 
Consulate in Wellington, but the Consul was recalled before that could happen.11 
Linked to this was the attempt to stop a repeat of the 1981 Springbok Tour; with a 
highly publicised campaign being waged to convince the board of the NZRFU to 
call off the planned rugby tour of South Africa in 1985. The official tour was called 
off but this did not stop a rebel tour from taking place in 1986.  
                                                   
9 Michael Bassett Working With David: Inside the Lange Cabinet Auckland: Hodder Moa 
Beckett, 2008,  passim; David Lange My Life Auckland: Viking, 2005,  pp. 185-265    
10 CER.: Closer Economic Relations – the main New Zealand-Australia free trade treaty 
11 Malcolm Templeton, Human Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand Attitudes to 
Race Relations in South Africa 1921-1994, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998, p. 
220  
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The closure of the South African Consulate was a sordid and bitter business 
and no one emerged unscathed. Roelf “Pik” Botha, the South African Foreign 
Minister was fast to discredit the closure. Botha was also of the view that the 
Consulate closure would not make New Zealand a more attractive trading partner in 
black Africa. Sympathisers and fellow-travellers of the apartheid regime in New 
Zealand voiced their indignation that the government had bowed to pressure from 
“foreign influence” and “internal subversives.” Those holding contrary views were 
outraged that in addition to the closure travel bans and other harsh measures were 
not put in place or that the government still refused to donate to the ANC or 
SWAPO.12 When Pretoria decided to withdraw the Consul-General because he was 
being unduly harassed, but in reality to avoid the further humiliation of being 
forcibly expelled, there was a distinct feeling of disappointment among the anti-
apartheid protesters along the lines of “The bastard got away!” It was the Labour 
party organisational apparatus, not the members of parliament had pushed for 
closure. This indicated a split between the more enthusiastic “rank-and-file” and the 
cautious party bosses over South Africa.13 
 
Pushing for the closure of the Consulate, thus embarrassing the Labour party MPs 
and forcing the hands of those involved, was almost certainly linked to the broader 
battles beginning to be waged over New Zealand’s economic policy. The left wing 
                                                   
12 SWAPO – South West African Peoples Organisation, the main liberation movement of 
Namibia.   
13 Templeton, Human Rights, p. 220  
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were beginning to lose to the centre-right of the party over the economic 
restructuring programme, and although the battles were only starting to take shape, 
the Consulate closure was a warning that an intra-party split would be hard to avoid 
in the future.     
Closing the South African Consulate aroused strong feeling up and down 
the country. This is reflected in a number of letters sent to the prime minister both 
before and after the 1984 general election. 14 Most striking is that letters favouring 
the closure of the Consulate outnumber those against, almost two to one. The 
relative uniformity of the letters in favour of closure and the number of women 
writing outnumbering the men is surprising. Some examples of the correspondence 
are a letter in favour of the Consulate from Auckland dated 20 August 1984 stating 
that, “…This move will be met and supported in the rest of Africa where our long 
term [emphasis added] interests are. Your moral stance [emphasis added] on this 
issue is a courageous move and supported by all my friends.”15   
In agreement a correspondent from Hamilton wrote that the decision to 
close the Consulate had “…raised a storm of protest from the overt and covert 
supporters of apartheid in this country…” but that despite this there were “… 
                                                   
14 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1  “New Zealand Affairs: External Relations 
– South Africa – Ministerial Letters Closure South African Consulate 1984”;  ABHS 
W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.2  “New Zealand Affairs: External Relations – South 
Africa – Ministerial Letters Closure South African Consulate 1984”   
15 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1   
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thousands (and, indeed, probably hundreds of thousands) of New Zealanders, like 
myself who support the action taken by your government.”16  
 
Most of these letters as well as proffering their congratulations and support also 
request that the then government put pressure on the NZRFU to cancel its planned 
tour of South Africa, and to hold firm on the anti-nuclear issue. Some, such as a 
woman from ‘Wanganui’ [sic] simply wanted to say that this stance on the 
Consulate was a “…effective protest against the injustices of their [i.e. the South 
African] government. When action such as this is taken I feel very proud of N.Z. 
[sic].”17 The most touching letters were those from children, which even if written 
at the behest of their parents or teachers, were sincere enough.                
More surprising is the diversity of reasons against the closure of the 
Consulate. Most were written by people living in the well-heeled suburbs of the 
main centres, but there were also many from the provinces and the more blue-collar 
suburbs of the major cities. 18 Based on the letters in the files, a majority of those in 
the cities were in favour of closure.19 Those in the rural areas, on the other hand, 
had their doubts. These men and women cited the need to maintain active 
engagement with the South Africans. There were accusations of left-wing mischief, 
which was a dog-whistle term for the influence of the liberation parties, their 
                                                   
16 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1   
17 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1 
18 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1;  ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 
Pt.2  
19 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1;  ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 
Pt.2   
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putative communist backers, and their local supporters in New Zealand, and naïve 
pleas to acknowledge the good intentions of the Botha administration. 20  
A woman from  Greytown deplored the closure of the Consulate on the 
grounds that a gradual approach to ending apartheid was the correct course of 
action and that since Lange, in her eyes had aligned himself with “…the Hart[sic] 
mob and [therefore] lost all credibility as a result. For the first time in my 53[sic] 
years I am ashamed to be a New Zealander.”21  Another woman felt that the closure 
was inconsistent as New Zealand still maintained diplomatic ties with “Russia” [i.e. 
the USSR] “…whose internal policies are far more destructive than that of South 
Africa.” 22  
 
Proving the old maxim that it is impossible to please everyone, there was a 
third group, those anti-apartheid campaigners who wanted to see further action, 
such as third party sanctions, or donations to the ANC on behalf of the New 
Zealand government (as opposed to the contributions made to the UN trust funds).23   
There are  a number of letters from outside New Zealand, such as a letter  
from residents  of the Szechenyi Homestead, Harare, Zimbabwe which supported 
the closure of the Consulate, and enclosed with it a copy of the Zimbabwe Herald, 
mistakenly reporting that that the consul had been expelled from New Zealand 
                                                   
20 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1;  ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 
Pt.2   
21 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1   
22 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1   
23 ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/7 Pt. 1 “Republic of South Africa: Social Affairs 
– Apartheid: H.A.R.T. [Halt All Racist Tours] [09/80-11/82]” 1980-1982 
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when he had in fact been withdrawn.24 Another was from a young New Zealand 
missionary in Zambia whom Lange had to reassure would not be stranded without 
due recourse when the Consulate closed. 25  One man living in Cape Town thought 
the closure was “…narrow minded, short sighted and incredible. It deserves full 
Marx.”26       
In the case of letters in support of government polices the replies followed a 
set formula of thanks. Responses to letters in disagreement with government policy 
often personally written by the minister in question refuted the reasons offered 
against the closure. One such letter written in reply to one woman from south 
Taranaki, who attempted to argue against the Consulate’s closure with appeals to 
Holy Scripture (Matthew 5:44-4627 and Romans 12:228) was told that,   
 
Everyone has been able to find biblical language which they consider justifies 
the policies the government believes [they] should pursue. I could in turn 
invite you to read in succession Galatians 3:2829 and Romans 16: 17-1830. But 
I would not want you [to] think that I believe those verses are relevant to a 
                                                   
24 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1. The copy of the Zimbabwe Herald was 
missing from the file.   
25 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.2  
26 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1   
27 “But now I tell you: love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you 
may become so that you may become the children of your father in heaven. For he makes 
his sun to shine on bad and good people alike, and gives rain to those who do good and 
those who do evil.”     
28 “Do not conform yourselves to the standards of this world, but let god transform you 
inwardly by a complete change of your mind. Then you will be able to know the will of God 
– what is good and what is pleasing to him and is perfect.”   
29 “So there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles, between slaves and free people, 
between men and women; you are all one in union with Christ Jesus”    
30 “I urge you my friends to look out for those who cause divisions and upset people’s faith 
and go against the teachings which you have received. Stay away from them! For those who 
do such things are not serving Christ our Lord, but their own appetites. By their fine words 
and flattering speech they deceive innocent people.”       
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policy that was adopted with no reference to scripture but with the interests of 
this country very much in mind. 31   
 
The reasons why many thought the closure of the consulate was a good idea are not 
hard to imagine. The Consulate was not doing anything to improve South Africa’s 
reputation in New Zealand. Most of the consuls, the unappealing Allan Harvey 
deserving special mention, were involved in questionable activities that sometimes 
bordered on the illegal. The scandal uncovered in 1980 involving the letter writing 
circle which was sending letters drafted by the South African Information 
Department  to organs of the New Zealand press on Consulate letterhead  is one 
example.32 Allowing South Africa to maintain a consular presence was sending the 
wrong signals about New Zealand to the wider world.  
The arguments for not closing the Consulate were more diverse and 
interesting. The most common reason was that a more constructive approach would 
yield better results and that isolation would only reinforce negative approaches to 
domestic policy in South Africa. These letters, sent to Lange’s office in his dual 
capacity as foreign and prime minister, were little better than racist screeds or 
excuses to vent spleen over the parlous state of the New Zealand economy. A large 
number of these also cited, as justification, New Zealand’s willingness to maintain 
relations with a variety of countries whose reputations were less than spotless. 
These criticisms overall were part of a broader phenomenon that Labour had not 
                                                   
31 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.2.  
32 Templeton, Human Rights pp. 219-220. Consul-General Harvey claimed that he was 
simply helping those who wanted to present the South African side of the story get their 
facts straight. He was let off with a warning.       
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anticipated while in office, the pro- South Africa lobby. ‘Pro South Africa’ a better 
label than pro-apartheid lobby as it covers the fact that a number of those opposed 
to sanctions were against apartheid and were convinced rightly or wrongly that 
cutting contact would only encourage Nationalist policies, and that positive 
persuasion was what was required to end apartheid. It included those who supported 
segregation in one form or another, along with the anti-communists who hated the 
idea of an enhanced communist presence in Africa, and believed that a white-ruled 
South Africa was a bulwark against that.  
Labour had the same problems as National with the anti-apartheid lobbyists 
and with the pro-South Africa groups, especially those who were anti-apartheid but 
disagreed with sanctions. An opposition party can overlook dissenting voices on 
such matters but in government, this is no longer an option. The sheer diversity of 
competing groups would disprove the caricatured view of a straightforward left-
right split on the matter of what to do about South Africa. There were many in the 
anti-sanctions camp that were not on the right by any stretch of the imagination and 
a great many pro-sanction types who could be as bigoted and small-minded as the 
regime they opposed.  
These influences go a long way to explaining the disorganisation and lack 
of coordination in New Zealand policy. Malcolm Templeton tries to make a case 
for a set of coherent ideas that guided policy makers, but with much wriggle room 
that was often prone to outside pressure. This is not entirely convincing. Templeton 
was writing mainly from the point of view of the ministry and was himself a former 
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Foreign Service officer. A background in the New Zealand Foreign Service 
undoubtedly gave him much valuable insight into policymaking, but less obvious 
when one first reads Human Rights and Sporting Contacts, is to what extent the 
work is an apologia for the oft-criticised actions of the ministry at that time.33        
The letters to the government demonstrate that South Africa was an 
emotive and controversial matter. This made it difficult to implement a sensible and 
coherent policy. The ambiguous behaviour of the South African government, 
wavering between repression and reforms meant that it was often hard to decide 
what the correct course of action was. Unsurprisingly it was not until the 
Nationalist government in South Africa had entered into serious negotiations with 
the liberation movements and the parliamentary opposition, that the New Zealand 
government was able to decide on a settled strategy to, stick with sanctions and 
encourage negotiations between the main antagonists. 
 
Finnegan vs. NZRFU and the 1986 Cavaliers tour of South Africa. 
 
The ‘reset’ of New Zealand’s South Africa policy was not without its 
bumps and false starts. One of the most infamous moments in New Zealand 
sporting history, the 1986 Cavaliers tour, has been misunderstood. It was a sign of 
major internal administrative problems within the NZRFU and a disappointing 
setback for the government’s attempt at rehabilitating the country’s image on the 
                                                   
33 Templeton, Human Rights, passim  
80 
 
    
international stage. The “Cavaliers’ tour” was in fact two tours, a first official tour 
that never took place, and a second unofficial tour that did take place.  
The official tour that had been sanctioned by the NZRFU and was to go 
ahead in 1985 was stopped by a court injunction. This was the result of the court 
case known as Finnegan vs. NZRFU.34 The court case was not a government 
intervention, but a private suit brought by a pair of lawyers acting on their own 
behalf. It is easy to see why the idea that Finnegan vs. NZRFU was a crown 
prosecution arose, as it coincided with a number of government initiatives on South 
Africa in the mid-1980s. The logic behind the eventual granting of the injunction 
was not that the Rugby Union was breaking the law of the land, but that it was 
violating its own charter by touring South Africa, and by extension alienating the 
population, which required it to promote the game of Rugby Union in New 
Zealand. Emotive testimony from the Reverend Makhenkesi ‘Arnold’ Stofile, who 
had travelled illegally to New Zealand from South Africa via Zimbabwe, on the 
possible effects that such a tour would have, probably contributed to the outcome. 
According to John Carlin, Stofile’s testimony was responsible for public support for 
sanctions against South Africa jumping from 40% to 75% in New Zealand. 35  
The verdict of Finnegan vs. NZRFU had an impact beyond New Zealand. 
This impact ranged from approval, such as the quote from Joseph Garba that opens 
                                                   
34 Finnegan being the name of one of the main plaintiffs, P.T. Finnegan, the other was P.J. 
Recordon.  
35 John Carlin, Invictus: Nelson Mandela and the Game That Made a Nation, London: 
Atlantic Books 2008 p. 67. Unfortunately, for his pains Stofile was arrested and sentenced 
to twelve years prison on his return to South Africa, but later went on to become a 
prominent figure in the post 1994 government.      
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the introduction, to this gem from the Paris embassy cables, dated 22 July 1985, 
from a New Zealand Embassy worker  
 
A gentleman who introduced himself as Didier Brault (and had no hesitation 
in spelling out his name when I asked) telephoned today. He said he simply 
wanted to say that he thought it was a pity that New Zealand had decided not 
to play rugby against South Africa. He said he thought it was bad for rugby 
and “illogical” since we played against the USSR and certain other South 
American countries who did not exactly have stainless records. M Brault was 
polite and spoke in excellent English. He made his point quickly and having 
done so simply said “that’s all.” I took him to be French although his accent 
might just have had a hint of South African in it. I said nothing back to him 
[handwritten: he wasn’t looking for an argument so I didn’t see any point in 
taking issue with him] except to ask him a second time for his name and at the 
end to thank him for his call. He was clearly looking for no response from us 
and apparently wanted just to register his point. 36             
 
In the court proceedings of Finnegan vs. NZRFU, the judge ruled for an injunction 
and the official tour was cancelled. This was far from the end of the story. The 
following year an unofficial tour, organised by private business interests in South 
Africa and indirectly backed by the South African government, went ahead anyway. 
37 The Cavaliers’ tour, unlike the 1981 Springbok tour, was a failure from a rugby 
standpoint, New Zealand losing the series. As well as that, it was also a political 
embarrassment. It did not augur well for the inaugural Rugby World Cup that was 
                                                   
36 ABHS W5402 18069 Box 54 BRU 198/1/1 “Country Series RSA General 01/1979-1985” 
1979-1985  
37Max Du Preez, Louis Luyt: Unauthorized, Cape Town: Zebra Press 2001 pp. 42-44      
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to be hosted jointly between New Zealand and Australia in 1987 and it imperilled 
the 1990 Commonwealth games. 38  
The Cavaliers’ tour of 1986 was, and still is, assumed to have had official 
sanction of one form or another. It did not. This fallacy arose because the tour was 
promoted in South Africa as an All Blacks tour. Nonetheless, such niceties did not 
matter in the grand scheme of things. As far as the Africans were concerned the 
New Zealand government had broken its promises and was back in the ‘doghouse’  
The Cavaliers’ tour is the most well known in New Zealand of all the 
“rebel” tours of the 1980s but it was not the only one. The cricket tours (these are 
better known internationally) in 1983, 1986 and 1990, and other illicit rugby tours 
(British and Irish Lions tours) and many other sporting events went against 
sanctions and caused anger and offence.39 Like the 1986 Cavaliers tour, these were 
ostensibly private ventures but also had the backing of the South African 
government in the form of tax breaks and the unofficial influence the politicians 
had on the sporting bodies.40  
                                                   
38 Templeton, Human Rights, p. 219. At this time the Commonwealth Games Committee 
awarded the hosting rights of the 1990 Games to Auckland. This was due to Lange 
convincing the Africans that the sporting tours were a thing of the past. Secondly, it was a 
means of enforcing good behaviour on behalf of the New Zealand government and the 
sporting bodies.  
39 AAXO W4246 22539 Box 47 “Calypso Cavaliers – West Indian Cricketers in South 
Africa: The Story of the 1983 Tour”; for a more general overview of the rebel tours of the 
1980s see Graeme Wright, Betrayal: The Struggle for Cricket’s Soul, London: H.F and G. 
Witherby 1993 pp. 7-10, 138-159, 201-213,  Carlin pp. 65-67, Max Du Preez, Louis Luyt: 
Unauthorized, Cape Town: Zebra Press 2001 pp. 42-44, David Kirk, Black and Blue, 
Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett 1997 pp. 75-94. Peter Hain, Don’t Play with Apartheid: 
The Background to the Stop the Seventy Tour, London: George Allen and Unwin 1971 
although dealing with an earlier period, is useful for background and context.           
40 Templeton, Human Rights, pp. 268-272   
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The Cavaliers’ tour and the problems it caused did eventually subside. 
Nonetheless, the tour had major repercussions on the tentative attempts to repair the 
damage of the 1981 Springbok tour. It alienated African leaders that the 
government wished to court over anti-nuclear measures and potential trade deals. 
Lange gave the Africans the impression that the subject was a dead issue, when it 
was not and this did not help this state of affairs. By far the greatest quantity of 
material in the files of the government and the ministry from this period is about the 
tour and the problems it caused. It provided the content to most of the dispatches of 
New Zealand overseas diplomats. It was the subject of many letters to the office of 
the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, David Lange. 41  
 
David Lange’s tour of Africa 1985 and the 1980s CHOGM Meetings.  
 
David Lange was a gifted orator and a man of great intelligence. He was 
also a deeply flawed character. He was emotionally needy and over sensitive in a 
degree dangerous to a politician, as his libel suits in later life would attest. Lange 
often began projects with zeal but would lose interest prior to their completion. His 
chief achievement was to be “the great salesman” at least until he began to question 
what he was selling. 42  
                                                   
41 AAXO W4246 22539 Box 47; ABHS W5579 6958 Box 102 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 37 
“Political Affairs – South Africa – Apartheid: Sports Contacts [04/1985-05/1985]” 1985  
42 Barry Gustafson. 'Lange, David Russell', in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography 
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/6l1/lange-david-russell 
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Lange’s replies to letters critical of the closure of the South African 
consulate as well as an acrimonious correspondence with HART coordinator John 
Minto illustrate his problems in dealing with criticism and his inability to suffer 
fools gladly. 43 It is however possible to postulate from these sources the probable 
motivations and factors behind a number of Lange’s major decisions as prime and 
foreign minister. Since Lange was, for his first term in government, foreign minister 
and prime minster, he had a stronger influence on foreign relations than Robert 
Muldoon and more so than Jim Bolger. In the second term of the fourth Labour 
government, Lange ceded the portfolio of foreign affairs to Russell Marshall. Not 
tied down holding two major portfolios, Marshall was in a better position than 
Lange to concentrate on the task was, making him an excellent choice to finish 
what Lange had started. Marshall had visited Africa during the 1970s and had been 
involved in the founding of the Africa Information Centre, a semi-official effort at 
improving New Zealand’s public knowledge of Africa. This and his background as 
a veteran anti-apartheid campaigner made him, in many ways, the ideal man to 
follow through with greater concentration what his predecessor had started. 44       
A number of African leaders had visited New Zealand in the 1970s, the 
first and most notable being Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who had struck up 
something of a friendship with the then prime minister Norman Kirk. Following 
                                                   
43 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.2 ; ABHS W4627 950 Box 3842 204/6/8/1/5 
Pt. 1 “Republic of South Africa: Social Affairs – Apartheid: Letters [01/80-03/85]” 
Archives New Zealand Central Office Wellington     
44 For more information on Marshall as Foreign Minister see Templeton, Human Rights,  
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Kirk’s death and Muldoon, taking power relations deteriorated, and there would be 
no such visits again until the 1990s. Lange’s 1985 tour of Africa, although not as 
well-known as the Oxford debate or the suspension of the ANZUS alliance, was of 
great importance. In the words of one contemporary commentator, Lange’s foreign 
policy, and Lange himself, represented an “emerging national self-confidence.” 45 
On the other hand, the trip to Africa was also about mending fences. Lange himself 
said at a University of Otago foreign policy conference in 1985 that he found the 
perceptions of New Zealand held by the politicians of those countries that he visited 
to be “fundamentally misinformed.” 46 Lange believed of the visit “Whatever else 
was achieved in Africa it was at the very least made plain that the government of 
New Zealand is no ally of South Africa.” 47 Lange himself was optimistic about the 
results of the visit claiming that the long-term benefits would be “very great.” 48 
Lange was also using his tour to scout for locations for the High Commission to be 
established somewhere on the continent.49 To judge from the newspaper clippings 
included in the files about the visit, the Africans themselves felt the same optimism 
as Lange did. 50   
                                                   
45 Martin Holland “Labour in Africa” in The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics 
in New Zealand,  ed. Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland, Auckland: Oxford University 
Press 1987 p. 242 
46 David Lange “The Fourth Labour Government: New Directions in Foreign Policy” in 
New Directions In New Zealand Foreign Policy: Twentieth Foreign Policy School, 
University of Otago, 1985, ed. Hyam Gold Auckland: Benton Ross 1985 p. 34     
47 ibid  
48 ibid 
49 Holland, p. 256  
50 AAWW W4640 7109 Box 10 “[Overseas Trips: Africa and India]” 1985. It needs to be 
noted that due to the censorship that was the norm in much of Africa in this period, these 
newspapers reflect official elite opinion and are a useful source for official reactions.       
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One of the major features of the 1980s diplomatic scene for the New 
Zealand Foreign Service was the series of CHOGM meetings. CHOGM meetings in 
the 1980s were fraught affairs with the racial cleavage between the white and non-
white Commonwealths widening. It must have been a relief to New Zealand 
politicians and diplomats that following the closure of the South African consulate 
in Wellington and the “reset” of New Zealand’s policy on apartheid,  the country 
and its government was no longer in the hot seat with decolonised Africa as at it 
used to be. The other main reason for this positive development is that for most of 
the 1980s it was in fact Britain which was often the subject of attacks over the 
refusal of the Conservative party and prime minister Margaret Thatcher to 
implement sanctions. Indeed, to some observers, it seemed that Thatcher was doing 
all she could to sabotage the sanctions campaign. This was not in fact the case. 
Thatcher disliked apartheid but her hatred of communism was stronger and thus 
working with the pre-1990 ANC was not an option. Lange said of this period that,   
 
Commonwealth Conferences were dominated in those days by the continuing 
struggle between Mrs Thatcher and the Africans. The latter wanted the 
Commonwealth to do something about South Africa and she was determined 
to stop them. She really was not happy unless she was falling out with the 
whole African bloc. She always tackled them head-on, spitting phrases like 
‘unfit to govern’ right at them.51           
 
Lange, despite later admitting a begrudging admiration for the British prime 
minister’s ability to be her own woman, disliked her mightily in this period and the 
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two disagreed on many things. Chris Laidlaw did not have a very high opinion of 
“the Iron Lady” calling her a “…self-righteous hand-bag brandishing bigot.” 52 
These comments are but a small sample of the criticisms levelled against Britain 
and Thatcher in the 1980s over the sanctions issue, and gives only the faintest of 
impressions of how nasty and bitter the whole subject became. It also shows 
effectively why New Zealand receded into the background on the international 
stage on this subject. This was for New Zealand a positive development as this gave 
the government some valuable time and space to regroup on South Africa.   
All sanctions on South Africa up until this time had been voluntary. What 
was under debate in the CHOGM meetings of the 1980s was making these 
sanctions mandatory, which would have negatively affected the considerable 
business interests of a number of countries like Britain but also the USA and a 
number of continental European countries that Britain needed support from in the 
EEC. South Africa was also in possession of a number of rare minerals that were 
only found in the Republic. This gave the South African government leverage 
against sanctions. It is likely that New Zealand would under National have 
supported the ‘anti-sanctions’ campaign in a tit-for-tat effort to retain important 
contacts over exemptions in EEC related agriculture negotiations. Under the Labour 
government, the reset of policy was pro sanctions on sport, culture, and academia. It 
was less definitive on economic sanctions and due to the reforms of the agricultural 
                                                   
52 Chris Laidlaw, Rights of Passage: Beyond the New Zealand Identity Crisis, Auckland: 
Hodder Moa Beckett 1999,  p. 81   
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market and the perceived importance South Africa had to the dairy and meat export 
industries.  
 
The Harare High Commission and Improving New Zealand’s Image in Africa.  
 
Even the most ardent pro-Africa supporters in the New Zealand 
government would have admitted that that there was going to be a struggle to 
convince the touchy leaders of decolonised Africa of the new government’s good 
intentions, with senior government ministers on record (albeit in the 1960s) 
condoning apartheid in South Africa.53 This had meant that, combined with issues 
of priority, cost, staffing and so on, a consular post and relations with Africa was 
not a priority before the 1980s. Trade was negligible and thus Africa was ruled out 
on economic grounds.54 The majority of the business involving African states could 
be handled in a very cost effective fashion by the Permanent Delegation to the UN 
in both New York and Geneva, and the Commonwealth desk at the New Zealand 
High Commission in London. The decision then to establish the High Commission 
in Harare was fundamentally political.   
                                                   
53 Barry Gustafson, Kiwi Keith: A Biography of Keith Holyoake, Auckland: Auckland 
University Press 2008, pp. 189-206  
54 There has been an increase in trade over the past decade, mostly with South Africa 
following the removal of sanctions but also with a number of other regions. For more 
information see John Allan, “Changing the conversation about Africa,” transcript of the 
opening address given at the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, October 2010 
http://www.nzembassy.com/south-africa/relationship-between-new-zealand-and-south-
africa/new-zealand-and-south-africa/speech-c     
89 
 
    
However, if official representation, diplomatic posts and trade deals, were 
the only way a country’s impact and affairs were to be judged, the picture becomes 
unbalanced. There is another side to the way in which states interact, based around 
unofficial connections. This is the civil society connections and despite the lack of 
official representation there were in the 1980s numbers of New Zealand ex-patriates 
living in southern Africa, mostly aid workers, missionaries, and contract workers. 
There were therefore a number of unofficial ambassadors for New Zealand in 
Africa, and these men and women did much to help counteract the problematic 
image the government was presenting. They were also able obliquely to influence 
events and decisions back home. A great many letters written to the government 
during the 1980s about the consulate closure and the Cavaliers’ tour were from 
New Zealand citizens living in African states worried about how the locals were 
going to react.55 Those concerned about the tour were worried for New Zealand’s 
reputation in Africa and those writing about the Consulate closure were afraid of 
being left stranded without representation based on a misunderstanding of the 
Consulate’s role in New Zealand.        
The opening of the New Zealand High Commission in Harare in May 1986 
was, therefore, important in a number of ways. The first and most obvious was that 
it was the first time that New Zealand had had a diplomatic and consular post in 
Africa. The second was that it was a convenient post from which to observe 
                                                   
55 ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 Pt.1;  ABHS W4627 950 Box 1465 58/204/1/1 
Pt.2 
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unfolding events in South Africa. The third was that it was a move beyond the more 
traditional areas of Europe, North America, and the Pacific. Unsurprisingly, it was 
around this time that a number of new posts began to open elsewhere, in Latin 
America, the Middle East and the soon to be former communist bloc, and the High 
Commission in New Delhi re-opened after having been closed by the Muldoon 
government.56 Harare, as the location of the New Zealand high commission, was in 
the words of Chris Laidlaw “…the natural, logical choice.” 57  
Despite this, there had been debate over the location and to judge; it would 
seem that Harare was simply the least bad option in terms of location safety and 
living standards.58 Harare was the most convenient location for cross-accreditation 
to other African states in southern and eastern Africa. It was, in the 1980s, due to 
the sanctions and restrictions in South Africa, a major hub of diplomacy and trade; 
Martin Holland estimates some 70 overseas posts in Harare in the 1980s. 59  
The choice of the first High Commissioner was also very much a strategic 
decision. Chris Laidlaw, had long experience in Commonwealth politics, well 
known sympathies for the developing world, progressive stance on indigenous 
issues, and that he had also been an All Black did not hurt. 60  
                                                   
56 Hyam Gold “Introduction” in New Directions In New Zealand Foreign Policy: Twentieth 
Foreign Policy School, University of Otago, 1985, ed. Hyam Gold. Auckland: Benton Ross 
1985 pp. 4-5   
57 Holland p. 255   
58 ibid p. 256 
59 ibid  
60 Chris Laidlaw “New Zealand and the Third World” in New Directions In  New Zealand 
Foreign Policy: Twentieth Foreign Policy School, University of Otago, 1985, ed. Hyam 
Gold Auckland: Benton Ross 1985 pp. 108-117;  Laidlaw, Rights of Passage, Passim; 
Holland pp. 255-259     
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Despite the effort put into improving New Zealand’s image in decolonised 
Africa, there were still those who had either not got the message or did not care. In 
his political manifesto-cum-memoir, Chris Laidlaw recalls a time where he was 
forced to save the proverbial bacon of a certain Christopher Martin, a New Zealand 
national and a former member of the French Foreign Legion. Martin had joined the 
South African army in a mercenary capacity and had been imprisoned in Zambia 
for his role in an attempted car bombing on ANC office in Lusaka. Laidlaw, much 
against his better instincts and preferences was forced to bail out this man to avoid a 
major international incident and escort him back to New Zealand. Laidlaw himself 
admitted that he would have rather have sent Martin back to South Africa and leave 
him to his fate. 61      
 
The Shadow of Rhodesia: Sanctions in Context 
  
 The New Zealand government of the 1960s probably overall found 
Rhodesia more challenging than later New Zealand governments   in the 1980s 
found South Africa. Unlike apartheid South Africa with its aggressively ‘Boer’ 
character, stolidly ‘British’ Rhodesia was far more congenial to Pakeha New 
Zealanders, many of whom had relatives or friends in Rhodesia. The communist 
factor was far more plausible in the 1960s as well and it was still socially 
acceptable to hold contemptuous attitudes towards Black Africans, which became 
                                                   
61 Laidlaw, Rights of Passage, pp. 88-90  
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less acceptable in the 1980s. In the case of Rhodesia, the government of New 
Zealand attempted to find a middle way between the need to show support for an 
important trading partner, in this case Britain and its desire to impose sanctions on 
the obstinate colony, and a need to placate a powerful conservative faction within 
the New Zealand government. In the end, the solution was a half-hearted attempt at 
following economic sanctions that were never really enforced thus allowing the 
New Zealand government to draw the erroneous conclusion that economic 
sanctions did not work. 62  
However unlike Rhodesia, which was relatively small and dependent on 
agriculture, South Africa was home to some very large international investments, 
had a relatively advanced industrial economy, and a number of mineral deposits not 
found anywhere else in the world. It was also in the 1980s the world’s main 
exporter of gold. Sanctions against South Africa therefore were going to have 
global ramifications, with potentially harmful impact on New Zealand via their 
effects on Britain, the EEC, the USA, and a number of Asian countries. Thus 
although Rhodesia was seen by many as a useful analogue to South Africa the 
comparison was not entirely appropriate for the reasons above. It is also important 
to note that the effectiveness of sanctions is, in practice, very difficult to determine. 
Central to the shifting attitudes and sanctions towards South Africa in New Zealand 
was the generational change, first in the public and later in the government, as well 
                                                   
62 For more information see Malcolm McKinnon, Independence And Foreign Policy: New 
Zealand In the World Since 1935, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993, pp.230-251;  
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as a well-fought campaign to change public attitudes by anti-apartheid groups. This 
was one of the most significant facts working to the advantage of the fourth Labour 
government. By the late 1980s there was no single line taken by all western powers 
on South Africa. Only the USA and UK continued to offer conditional support in 
the form of a refusal to impose sanctions whereas the CANZ group had begun to do 
so. A number of western European EEC member states already were or had begun 
to impose their own sanctions. The third world countries, needless to say, had been 
following their own sanctions programme independent of the West, for many years.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In closing, the decision to force the closure of the South African consulate 
and the decision to open the Harare High Commission were in fact two sides of the 
same coin, with the goal of improving New Zealand’s image in the developing 
world. The belief that South Africa was sliding towards a military dictatorship 
along with questions about Botha’s political reliability, convinced much of the New 
Zealand population to go along with the realignment, although as the letters written 
over the closure of the consulate show, not everyone felt comfortable about these 
developments. When compared with a number of other countries, however, the 
New Zealand approach was conventional, given the restrictions and limitations that 
had to be taken into account, although the ramifications had often been far from 
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conventional. In the broader context of the period 1981-1994 the developments of 
the fourth Labour government was on the surface an attempt to emphasise ideals, 
and up to a certain point it was. However there was also an element of pragmatism 
to this as well; as there was no benefit whatsoever to New Zealand in being seen as 
supporting South Africa. Although the South African Consulate closure was 
fundamentally an empty gesture, it was nonetheless a very effective one in terms of 
New Zealand’s image abroad. The Consulate closure certainly helped the 
government acquire enough credibility to allow the embarrassing Cavaliers tour to 
blow over with none of the recrimination that followed tours in 1976 and 1981. 
Labour faced most of the same issues that National had done in the early 1980s 
except from a different angle. National had to juggle an obdurate rural base with 
more liberally minded suburban dwellers. Labour on the other hand, were often 
attempting to balance the perspective of a centre and left mostly urban base that 
comprised the protest movement, and its more conservative wing, and not always 
with success.         
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Chapter Three: The Period of the National Government and the End of 
Apartheid 1990-1994    
Liberal reformers tended to see liberalization as a way of defusing opposition 
to their regime. They would ease up on repression, restore some civil liberties, 
reduce censorship, permit broader discussion of public issues, and allow civil 
society – associations, churches, unions, business organisations – greater 
scope to conduct their affairs. Liberalizers did not, however, wish to introduce 
fully participatory competitive elections that could cause current leaders to 
lose power. They wanted to create a kinder, gentler, more secure and stable 
authoritarianism without altering fundamentally the nature of their system. 
Some reformers were undoubtedly unsure themselves how far they wished to 
go in opening up the politics of their country. They also at times undoubtedly 
felt the need to veil their intentions: democratizers tended to reassure 
standpatters by giving the impression that they were only liberalizing; 
liberalizers attempted to win broader popular support by creating the 
impression that they were democratizing. Debates consequently raged over 
how far Geisel, Botha, Gorbachev, and others “really” wanted to go.  
 
Samuel P. Huntington, How Countries Democratize 1992  
 
The 1990 Bolger National government had altered its traditional approach 
to South Africa in the face of changing political circumstances. South Africa’s 
transformation took many, not the least the National party, by surprise. It was a 
cautious change as not all were enthusiastic or optimistic about changes, in South 
Africa or New Zealand. The relatively passive stance taken by the National 
government was a result of the priority that domestic affairs took in the years 1990-
1994, and an international situation that did not allow for acts that could be 
interpreted as support for the increasingly shaky Nationalist government in Pretoria.  
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The period 1990-1994 was probably the most complex and challenging 
period from a South African standpoint. Following the forced resignation of P.W. 
Botha in 1989 and the assumption of the presidency by F.W de Klerk, the liberation 
parties were re-legalised and negotiations to determine the future constitutional 
settlement of South Africa were pursued with varying degrees of success. This 
culminated in the 1994 election and appointment of the first ANC government in 
South Africa. In New Zealand, the National Party, which came to power in the 1990 
election, was more preoccupied with domestic affairs but shared the outgoing 
Labour government’s desire to improve New Zealand’s image in the developing 
world. It was therefore happy to maintain its predecessor’s policies albeit in scaled 
down form due to budget issues.        
 
After Botha 
 
To understand properly the challenges that the Bolger government faced 
with respect to relations with South Africa in the years 1990-1994, it is necessary to 
appreciate the speed and uncertainty with which events in South Africa unfolded. 
Following the forced retirement of P.W Botha in 1989, following a stroke, long 
time cabinet minister, and Nationalist party apparatchik, F.W de Klerk replaced 
him. The older segregation laws had been scrapped by the Nationalists in an 
attempt to show their bona fides to the outside world, and to their internal 
opposition. The three main apartheid laws, the Natives Land Act (1913), the Group 
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Areas Act (1950), the Population Registration Act (1949), and the restricted 
franchise stubbornly remained in place, as did much of the draconian security 
legation and censorship laws.1 The Homelands were still officially in existence. 
Without the legitimising context of the Cold War, White South Africa’s need to 
find a settlement looked more pressing than ever. Political prisoners were released, 
including Nelson Mandela. Commenting on these events prominent anti-apartheid 
journalist Allister Sparks observed in 1991 “Verwoerd was right. Concessions don’t 
ease pressure or buy time and the introduction of piecemeal reforms do introduce 
illogicalities that make it harder to hold one’s ground.”2 President P.W Botha’s 
“concessions,” the 1983 Constitution and Tricameral Parliament, had backfired in 
spectacular fashion.  
Officially, the traditional story of the end of apartheid is that the Nationalist 
party, unable to live with its own wickedness anymore, and the ANC being the 
forgiving paragons of popular repute, decide to begin negotiations in 1991 with the 
CODESA. Following a false start, these negotiations come to a triumphant 
conclusion with the first full election of April 1994, the inauguration of Nelson 
Mandela as president, the Springbok’s victorious campaign in the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup, and the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. 3 This version of history 
                                                   
1 David R Penna “Apartheid, The Law and Reform in South Africa” in Africa Today Vol. 
37, No. 2 Dismantling Apartheid: Problems and Possibilities (Second Quarter 1990) pp. 5-
21      
2 Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 
London: Mandarin Paperbacks 1991  p. 329  
3 John Carlin, Invictus: Nelson Mandela And The Game That Made A Nation, London: 
Atlantic Books 2009, passim; Allister Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside 
Story Of South Africa’s Road To Change,  New York: Hill and Wang 1995,  passim; Patti 
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serves as a plot line for a number of popular histories and Hollywood films, 
including Clint Eastwood’s 2009 film Invictus. However, it is lacking and gives no 
indication of just how fraught and complicated the whole process was, or even that 
it happened at all. 
Sanctions and sporting contacts remained an issue. In 1992, the ANC, 
finding that F. W de Klerk was a man that they could do business with, stated that 
sporting contacts were going to resume. 4 The first major outing was South Africa’s 
surprise showing in the 1992 Cricket World Cup (co-hosted by New Zealand), 
when it reached the semi-finals. This was followed by South Africa’s return to the 
Summer Olympics at Barcelona. Later, in August of 1992, seven years after the 
Cavaliers Tour, the first official All Blacks tour of South Africa in over twenty 
years took place. This however did not end well in either political or rugby terms. 
The refusal of the South African rugby officials to follow ANC requests meant that 
sanctions were re-imposed. 5  
In retrospect, it was only a matter of time until P.W. Botha’s aggressive 
behaviour caught up with him. Many of his ‘colleagues’ had been looking for a way 
to give die Groot Krokildil the push for some time. The Total Strategy was not 
working, as was evidenced by the continued violence in the townships, now 
spreading to the Homelands, the rural areas and even into the (white) suburbs. 
                                                                                                                                  
Waldmeir, Anatomy Of A Miracle: The End Of Apartheid And The Birth Of The New South 
Africa, New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company 1997,  passim         
4 Max du Preez, Louis Luyt: Unauthorised, Cape Town: Zebra Press 2001 pp. 65-75; Carlin, 
pp. 112-113    
5 Carlin, pp.  112-113 
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Attempts to reach out to the opposition had not been a success. The border war was 
grinding on, costing lives, and money that South Africa could not afford to waste. 
The article “How Countries Democratize” by Samuel P. Huntington, published in 
the winter of 1991-1992, is an analysis of the so-called “Third Wave 
Democratizion” of 1974-1990, starting with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 
1974 and ending with the collapse of Communism in 1990, in which a number of 
authoritarian regimes gave way to (mostly) democratic governments. 6 Huntington 
in his article classified four varieties of transition. Transformation, when a 
democratic regime grows out of an older authoritarian one in a controlled fashion 
for example Spain after the death of Generalissimo Franco and Hungary under 
Communist rule. Replacement, when the incumbent regime is overthrown by means 
fair or foul, for example East Germany or Argentina. Intervention, in which the 
regime is overthrown by outside actors.7 Finally, Transplacement, when negotiation 
between regime and opposition are needed to break the stalemate.8 South Africa 
according to Huntington was an example of Transplacement, Pretoria was too 
strong to be overthrown, but it was hobbled by its legitimacy crisis, financial 
problems, and external security problems.9 As Huntington puts it,  
 
                                                   
6 Samuel P. Huntington “How Countries Democratize” in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
106, No. 4 (Winter 1991-1992) pp. 579-616      
7 ibid, p. 582      
8 ibid, p. 616   
9 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: A Biography Of A People, London: Hurst And 
Company 2003 pp.  611-634    
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In transplacements, the eyeball to eyeball confrontation in the central square 
of the capital between massed protesters and serried ranks of police revealed 
each side’s strengths and weaknesses. The opposition could mobilize massive 
support; the government could contain and withstand opposition pressure.10                              
 
The negotiations to bring the ANC to power were not the result of principle but 
necessity. As the quote from Huntington at the start of this chapter states, it is 
difficult to draw the line over what was intentional and what were the unintended 
consequences of the decisions to liberalise the system in the 1980s. The opening 
quote of the chapter instances Botha but the same could be said of de Klerk.  
 
The Modernisation of the National Party and the 1990 Election.  
 
In New Zealand, the fourth Labour government was losing momentum, 
internally divided and lacking leadership; following the ousting of finance minister 
Roger Douglas in 1988 and the resignation of David Lange in 1989. Geoffrey 
Palmer and Mike Moore both served some of the shortest tenures as prime minister 
in New Zealand history, adding to the sense that the government had lost control of 
the country. It came as no surprise when Labour lost the general election of 1990. 
The National party won by a landslide under the leadership of the outwardly 
amiable and easy-going Jim Bolger.  
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Labour’s ambitious, some would say unrealistic, approach towards 
international relations was traditionally disdained by National which preferred to 
focus on trade and strengthening relations with  traditional Western allies. In 
contrast, relations with decolonized Africa were historically a problem for the 
National Party. There were two reasons for this. The first was the trade-based 
small-state mentality that overlooked areas that held little trading potential. The 
second was that National, because of being a conservative party, was awkward in 
dealing with third world nations and problems in the developing world. As a result, 
when white rule in South Africa ended, a National government had to do more to 
show its good faith to the incoming ANC than a Labour government would needed 
to have done. National initially had greater difficulty in adjusting to these changes 
because of its historical views on sporting contacts and its support for the 1976 All 
Blacks tour of South Africa and the disastrous 1981 Springbok tour of New 
Zealand.        
Prime Minister Bolger was mainly concerned with domestic issues in New 
Zealand during this period and did not have the same interest in foreign affairs as 
Lange. He was by nature a pragmatist and a problem solver. His cabinet colleague 
and later successor as Prime Minister Jenny Shipley thought that Bolger was not 
“…a leader of ideas” but “…a leader capable of dealing with the issues of the 
time…”11 New Zealand in 1990 was a different place than New Zealand in 1980. 
                                                   
11 Jenny Shipley “Reform and Reaction” in The Bolger Years 1990-1997 ed. Margaret Clark 
Wellington: Dunmore Publishing 2007 p 162   
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The feelings of dissatisfaction and malaise that hung in the air were a common 
thread between the two. The 1987 stock market crash had hit the New Zealand 
markets harder than most other nations and the economy took longer to recover. 
The economic restructuring - “Rogernomics” - of the 1980s was not yielding the 
results its supporters had promised, and another dose of pain was on the way 
courtesy of Finance Minister Ruth Richardson – “Ruthanasia.” The New Zealand 
sesquicentennial year was blighted by a series of protests and government blunders 
over the Treaty of Waitangi claims tribunal. The electorate was growing 
increasingly dissatisfied with politicians. If foreign affairs came low on the list of 
the government’s priorities, as opposed to trade, which could boost the economy, 
then one can hardly blame it.  
Comparing the different personalities and backgrounds of Bolger and his 
predecessor as National Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon can yield insight into 
these changes Bolger was in a number of ways a typical National MP. He came 
from a pleasingly bucolic background being a dairy farmer from the King Country, 
was conservative on social issues (was anti-abortion) and was able to project the 
image of a good family man (fathered nine children). Bolger had supported the 
1981 Springbok tour at the time although he later changed his mind about it, and 
was sceptical on the reset of foreign policy by Lange’s Labour government. Bolger, 
unlike Muldoon, despite being a supporter of the western alliance, was never really 
in sympathy with the ‘kith and kin’ line of reasoning that that still resonated for 
many in the National Party. Almost certainly, this was because of his Irish and 
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Catholic background; his mother and father were immigrants from Ballyconran, 
County Wexford, Eire. Unlike Muldoon, who was beside himself with joy when he 
received his knighthood, and a very keen supporter of the monarchy, Bolger was 
the only National prime minister to date to refuse a knighthood and was an 
outspoken supporter of New Zealand becoming a republic. This was previously a 
position traditionally held by Labour. Muldoon was born in 1921, lived through 
both the Great Depression, and served in the Second World War, both of which 
heavily coloured his outlook on international politics and domestic policy. Bolger 
on the other hand was born in 1935 meaning that both the Second World War and 
the Great Depression were no more than childhood memories and not as much of an 
influence on his political thinking, as was the case interestingly enough, with David 
Lange (born in 1942).12       
These ‘maverick’ traits of Bolger in many ways overlapped with the 
modernisation of the National party, which began in earnest following the electoral 
drubbing of 1984. It involved renewed emphasis on National’s historic liberalism 
and pragmatism. The modernisation of the National Party’s foreign policy was also 
tied to external factors. The shift in New Zealand’s stance vis-à-vis South Africa 
was at its root demographic and ideological. Demographic in that a newer 
generation of voters were coming of age, and ideological in that following the end 
of the Cold War, most if not all of the main planks for defending apartheid were no 
                                                   
12 Jim Bolger, Bolger, A View from the Top: My Seven Years As Prime Minister, Auckland: 
Viking 1998 passim; Barry Gustafson, His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon 
Auckland: Auckland University Press 2000 passim   
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longer perceived as having any weight or validity. Domestic opinion had shifted in 
favour of a twofold approach of sanctions and encouragement for negotiations. It 
was no longer politically sensible to swim against these currents, no matter how 
tempting it was to hold on to the past.  
In comparison to the two previous governments, Prime Minister Bolger did 
not attempt either to run foreign policy by stealth by appointing a less than 
adequately qualified candidate, as was Muldoon’s strategy with Warren Cooper; or 
simply to just take over the portfolio himself as David Lange had. Bolger was more 
than happy to leave foreign affairs in the hands of Don McKinnon who was in the 
opinion of Bolger  
 
…a very effective and loyal deputy on whom I could place absolute trust. His 
non-flamboyant style meant he tended to undersell his success. His long 
tenure as Foreign Minister [Bolger was writing in 1998] means that he is one 
of the experienced wise heads on a huge range of international issues. Many in 
the Commonwealth believe he would make an ideal Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth when the position becomes vacant in 1999. 13     
 
Malcolm McKinnon states in Independence and Foreign Policy that, the foreign 
policy of the National party has not attracted as much attention from scholars as 
that of the Labour Party. 14 Passages in Malcolm Templeton’s Human Rights and 
Sporting Contacts, and the journal articles of David McCraw, are the major 
                                                   
13 Bolger, A View from the Top, p. 62. McKinnon did indeed become Secretary General of 
the Commonwealth in 2000, a position he held until 2008.     
14 Malcolm McKinnon, Independence And Foreign Policy: New Zealand In the World Since 
1935, Auckland: Auckland University Press 1993, pp. 12-13    
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exceptions. Barry Gustafson has little to say about foreign relations in his history of 
the National Party but dedicated substantial passages to the subject in his 
biographies of Holyoake and Muldoon. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a very 
general common theme across National administrations, namely a greater emphasis 
on pragmatism than was the case with Labour.  
 
The CHOGM meetings of the 1990s and the CODESA negotiations.  
 
The last time a New Zealand prime minister met his (and until 1999 they 
were all ‘he’s’) South African counterpart was in 1960 (Keith Holyoake and 
Hendrick Verwoerd respectively) when South Africa made its exit from the 
Commonwealth. It was appropriate that Jim Bolger met Nelson Mandela at the 
Harare CHOGM summit in 1991.15 Mandela was not president of South Africa yet. 
The Commonwealth might have seemed to be an anachronism. “…a sort of rapidly 
concocted salve applied to the wound Britain suffered from the loss of empire after 
the Second World War.”16 Despite this, it was for years the main forum for 
sanctions and negotiations on South Africa. This was because of the 
Commonwealth’s historic links to southern Africa and the weaknesses of the USA’s 
                                                   
15 Bolger, A View from the Top, pp. 220-222. A fictionalised meeting between Bolger and 
Mandela features in the film Invictus where both men watching the 1995 Rugby World Cup 
final between the All Blacks and the Springboks. Bolger unnamed and credited as “New 
Zealand Prime Minister” but recognisable because of the poor New Zealand accent, offers 
Mandela a wager of swapping South Africa’s gold for sheep. Mandela counters Bolger’s 
wager with an offer of a case of wine. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1057500/quotes.         
16 David Adamson, The Last Empire: Britain and the Commonwealth, London: I B Taurus 
and Company 1989, p. 34   
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Africa policy. Because of the USA’s own history of racial discrimination, the 
ability of the Americans to play the role of honest brokers in the region was too 
limited to make any difference. In addition, the USA's anti-apartheid movement 
was small and developed late by comparison with those in the Commonwealth 
countries, meaning that the sort of public pressure and political cost was simply not 
a factor for American policy makers that it was for say Britain, Australia, or New 
Zealand.            
The CODESA negotiations and debates over social and economic policy 
became intense because both sides wanted the same things; peace, prosperity, and a 
common nation where all could feel they belonged and to which they could 
contribute. The conflict was over means not ends. It would seem that de Klerk, like 
many in the 1980s and 1990s, had caught the neo-liberal ‘bug’ and decided that 
now was as good a time as any to engage in liberalisation and privatisation of the 
South African economy. The ANC, which was livid at the thought of having what 
was in effect a large spoils system and the basis of any future patronage taken away 
from it, made a very effective appeal to black public opinion. This effectively ended 
any real economic reform for the near future. Accusations that de Klerk’s attempts 
at reforming the economy were a pre-emptive attempt to nix any major 
redistribution were widely believed. Washington Post journalist David Ottaway, in 
the book Chained Together states that… 
 
…de Klerk was just as crafty in his choice of words in his discussion of the 
economy and economic reforms. His terminology made it seem he was 
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addressing the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund rather than 
the South African parliament. He used words like structural readjustment and 
privatization and deregulation and talked of restructuring government 
expenditures and shrinking government control over the economy. “We still 
persist with the implementation of the required structural adjustments,” he 
said. He even seemed to have an eye on Washington, where the Regan and 
Bush administrations had made a fetish of supply-side economics. De Klerk 
promised that his government would “give particular attention to the supply 
side of the economy. 17       
 
Official negotiations ran into a wall in 1992, following a series of sensational 
killings and massacres involving the security forces and militia groups. Following a 
resumption of mass protests, negotiations reverted to talks between the ANC and 
the Nationalists; the head of the South African Communist Party Joe Slovo was 
able to break the impasse in part by suggesting a sunset clause for all civil servants 
for the next five years. There were a great many others including the chiefs, much 
of the white right, and the IFP, who were refusing to participate in the broader talks 
that followed.   
The New Zealand diplomats observing in Harare were despite numerous 
research trips to South Africa and fact-finding missions, uncertain and fearful about 
what was going to happen next.18 The overall tone was pessimistic and the High 
Commission staff did not hold out much hope for a peaceful settlement. They were 
greatly concerned over the divide and lack of mutual understanding between the 
                                                   
17 Daniel Ottaway, Chained Together: Mandela, De Klerk, And The Struggle To Remake 
South Africa, Toronto: Random House, 1993,  p. 77    
18 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 42 “Political – South Africa – Sporting 
Contacts 1991-1994” 1991-1994 
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protagonists. The New Zealand High Commission staff were worried about the 
possibility of negotiations falling apart due to the widely held belief of South 
African government complicity in attacks on the ANC and its supporters. 19 One 
cable from Harare dated 26 June 1992 illustrates the on-going anxiety, regarding 
the possibility of a boycott of the Barcelona Olympics (some of the text is partially 
obscured, reconstructions are in square brackets),    
 
First Pan African Congress (PAC) claiming to speak on behalf of all liberation 
movements in South Africa asserted that Black South African athletes would 
be included in the South African Olympic team. African boycott [of the 
games] would inevitably occur if South African [team went to Bar]celona. 
Second, senior Spanish diplomat [(who are] like us, for Security Council 
lobbying) told us [that the sug]gestion of African boycott is intolerable to [to 
them and] that Spanish government would make (had made?) that [clear] to 
the SAG (South African Government) already. De Klerk was in Spain last 
week.  
In claiming ANC has strong evidence of SAG complicity in recent bloodshed, 
Mbeki20 asserted on 26 June that it was committed to negotiation within South 
Africa and will keep under review how SAG reacts to ANC list of actions 
required to defuse violence in South Africa (circulated in OAU meeting) 
including disbandment of security force units. He called for strong 
international condemnation and “maximum pressure” on SAG so that regime 
was unable to block process of change. He spoke of emergence of broad-based 
anti-apartheid front within South Africa that extends beyond liberation 
movements. It was carefully constructed. Strong but non-radical speech.21           
 
                                                   
19 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 42  
20 Thabo Mbeki, senior ANC strategist and negotiator; later successor to Nelson Mandela as 
president of South Africa in 1999    
21 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 42  
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This was at the peak of the violence and uncertainty of events in South Africa. 
What this meant for the politicians back in Wellington was a need to prepare for the 
possibility of a military takeover in South Africa, a possible influx of refugees to 
New Zealand via the High Commission in Harare, or even civil war or a foreign 
invasion of South Africa. None of these were desired outcomes by the diplomats in 
Harare, who had to remain vigilant about what may happen next, but also try to use 
their good offices to persuade the main actors in South Africa not to stop 
negotiations. 22    
 
 
 
The End of the Cold War and Namibian Independence.   
 
The final collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet system at the end of 
1991 had massive ramifications for South Africa. One of the chief reasons apartheid 
lasted until the 1990s was that the Nationalists were able to stoke fears over an 
African “domino theory,” lending credence to the idea of apartheid South Africa as 
an anti-communist bulwark. The letters sent to the New Zealand government over 
the closure of the South African Consulate frequently stated that white-ruled South 
Africa was a bulwark against the communist influence in Africa. The removal of 
                                                   
22 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 102 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 40 “Political Affairs – South Africa – 
Apartheid: Sports Contacts [11/1987-07/1989]” 1987-1989; ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 
NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 41 “Political – South Africa – Sporting Contacts 1989-1991” 1989-1991; 
ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 42   
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the communist factor left apartheid without what was for many a major 
justification. A large number of influential people believed this to be so. The 
influence of the South African Communist Party within the ANC had always been a 
point of controversy. Robert Service in his survey of world communism in the 
twentieth century, states that the SACP as a political force was overestimated and 
even the Soviets did not think much of them, the ANC generally perceived as being 
the ‘winning horse’. 23 This link was personified by the SACP head and for many 
years chief ANC tactician Joe Slovo. The important role he played in the CODESA 
talks was a major source of unease for many. To judge from the contents of the 
Harare High Commission cables, this communist factor was not the paramount 
problem from an official New Zealand point of view it had once been. The 
problems with the IFP and rogue elements of the police, armed forces, and white 
rights activists being a greater cause for concern.24    
Another development, in addition to the end of the Cold War, was the 
eventual negotiation of Namibian independence in 1990. Namibia had been a South 
African administered territory since the days of the Great War and the League of 
Nations, in the same way Samoa was under New Zealand suzerainty until 1962. 
There was a white settler population of both Afrikaner and German descent in 
                                                   
23 Robert Service, Comrades. Communism: A World History, London: Pan Macmillan 2007 
pp. 392-393. The alliance was to a certain extent born out of necessity following the post 
Sharpeville clampdown, but over the years, this link to the eastern bloc had been both a 
blessing and a curse. On the one hand, this alliance had given the ANC links to the 
European left which provided a much-needed source of revenue and ideas. On the other, 
many of the ideas that sprung from this alliance, the nationalisation of land, banks, the 
mines, and “monopoly capital,” along with potential political reprisals and institutional 
purges made many nervous. 
24 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 102 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 40; ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 
3/7/3/1 Pt. 41; ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 42  
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Namibia and hence it had value on demographic grounds, as it boosted the numbers 
of the white population of South Africa, Namibia was also a drain on the South 
African government’s resources. South Africa’s continuing refusal to recognise 
Namibia’s independence was in direct violation of a number of UN resolutions on 
decolonisation. The solution of the Namibian problem gave the South African 
government more leeway and resources to focus on the internal situation that was 
becoming more precarious. Again, the reaction in New Zealand was mostly 
positive, as the transition was relatively smooth.  
The third change in the international scene was a moderation in the stance 
of a great many of the liberation governments in the rest of decolonised Africa 
based on economic stagnation, loss of international support and internal discontent. 
Some were overthrown; others allowed themselves to be voted out of office. Either 
way, the older way of “one man, one vote, once only” was by no means dead, but 
no longer had to be the default mode, a very promising sign for the future          
 
The case for optimism… 
 
Changes in the international situation combined with important internal 
factors took much of the sting out of the South African government’s predicament. 
The first major change was that by 1990 the majority of white South Africans, 
although distrustful of the liberation movements and their intentions, had moved on 
from a belief in ‘separate development’. A younger generation of whites, 
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Afrikaners in particular, had not experienced the same deprivations of their elders 
and were embarrassed by the negative image of their country. The cultural 
liberalisation of white South Africa was significant and can be traced back to the 
introduction of television in 1975. More books and films, both foreign and local, 
began to get past the censors with greater frequency. A more sceptical attitude on 
the part of the white intelligentsias, both Anglophone and Afrikaans, meant that a 
great many whites were more willing to take a critical attitude towards apartheid, 
although it did not lessen their anxiety over the possible effects of black rule. 25   
South Africa’s changing demographics was the more significant domestic 
development. The black population explosion of  the second half of the twentieth 
century, combined with a declining white birth rate, meant that the ratio needed to 
maintain control over the official economy and the monopoly on violence (pace 
Weber), was becoming less sustainable. 26  The New Zealand’s government’s 
conservative approach and attitude of cautious optimism meant many doubted the 
sincerity or reality of these changes. A number of New Zealand observers would 
later express a great deal of admiration for Mandela’s handling of the situation, 
including former sceptic Jim Bolger.27  In the eyes of New Zealand diplomats and 
politicians, the possibility of Mandela becoming South Africa’s next president after 
de Klerk was reassuring. Even a number of former sceptics were coming around to 
the prospect of black rule in South Africa. Appeasing the pro-South Africa groups 
                                                   
25 Giliomee, Afrikaners,  pp. 593-595    
26 ibid  
27 Bolger, A View From The Top, pp.220-226  
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in New Zealand became less pressing, and granted Bolger and McKinnon greater 
freedom to act. The anti-apartheid groups, meanwhile, were perhaps worried that 
their cause was coming to an end and refused to believe what was happening in 
South Africa was real. They continued to lobby for cancellations of a variety of 
resumed contacts, even though this was against the wishes of the liberation 
movements in South Africa.28 In some ways, it was in keeping with the patterns and 
trends of the past decade but in other ways, it was a novel development that the 
anti-apartheid groups were being chastised by those they were, technically, meant 
to be supporting.  
Overall, the general effect on New Zealand foreign policy on South Africa 
was to encourage the continuation of the Lange reset that had taken place in 1985. 
There was little point in reverting to older practice although there might be need to 
prepare for the worst.  
 
…And the case for pessimism.    
 
In spite of all the positive developments, there was still cause for concern. 
Civil war was a possibility as South Africa’s security forces lost their internal 
discipline and morale was low. One of the most enduring legends of apartheid that 
has been actively propagated by the current South African government is that much 
of the violence of the period 1990-1994 was caused by a so called “third force.”  
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This was said to consist of the security forces and IFP supporters who were 
seen as attempting to destabilise the negotiation process and prolong the rule of the 
Nationalists and the white right. The third force was a myth. There was no 
organised campaign by the government to derail negotiations. Much of the violence 
was the result of the ANC’s hegemonic ambitions, a police force that had been 
pushed to its limits of capacity and undermined by a nasty propaganda campaign, 
and an ethnic dimension to black politics that few wished to address. The Xhosa 
monopoly on senior positions within the ANC and the resulting Zulu alienation was 
the main cause of the ANC-IFP split, and a major factor behind the ensuing 
violence. Giliomee, summed up the character of much of the violence as being a 
fight for the prize of the South African state “…with an understaffed and often 
undisciplined police force on the one side, and embittered, sometimes desperate 
freedom fighters on the other.”29 New Zealand diplomats stationed in Harare were 
preparing for the worst and did not share the cautious optimism of their colleagues 
back in Wellington. The fact that the situation in South Africa did not deteriorate 
any more than it did owe a great deal to the good faith and honourable intentions of 
F.W. de Klerk. Nelson Mandela often gets the credit and the praise for the 
‘peaceful’ and ‘miraculous’ end to apartheid in South Africa, de Klerk’s 
contribution is often either ignored, diminished or derided. He did not use the 
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military as a base to negotiate from, allowed a relatively impartial investigation into 
the violence, and knew when to step aside with his dignity intact.30   
The National government in New Zealand was never in doubt about de 
Klerk’s intentions. There was however, a concern that the New Zealand 
government would be called upon for peacekeeping troops and aid money if the 
South African situation deteriorated further.31  There was still cause for pessimism.  
 
The 1994 Election in South Africa. 
 
The 1994 South African general election was, for many, a hopeful symbol 
of redemption and reconciliation. In reality, it was not so much an election in that it 
was a contest of ideas but a confirmation of a foregone conclusion. Donald 
Horowitz memorably said that it was not an election but a census. Professor David 
Welsh went as far to write that  
…For reasons of State South Africans have been required to subscribe to the 
latest national myth, namely that the elections were ‘substantially free and 
fair’ they were nothing of the kind and hardly any of the sanctimonious 
foreign observers who fell about themselves to declare it so would have for 
one moment have accepted the validity of an election subject to such flaws in 
their own country. 32   
 
                                                   
30 ibid, pp. 637 Giliomee is however critical de Klerk’s approach, viewing it as weakness 
and a misguided strategic blunder.     
31 ABHS W5579 6958 Box 103 NYP 3/7/3/1 Pt. 42  
32 David Welsh quoted in R.W Johnson, “How Free? How Fair?” in Launching Democracy 
In South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994 ed. R.W Johnson and Lawrence 
Schlemmer, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1996 p 323  
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There were doubts over the honesty of the vote in the rural areas and in the 
townships, both virtual fiefdoms of the Nationalists and its breakaway, the 
Conservative Party, and the ANC respectively. It was almost impossible for smaller 
parties such as the Democratic Party or the PAC (Pan Africanist Conference) which 
lacked the influence and the funds of the two larger parties to gain a foothold in the 
polls and the vote in KwaZulu – Natal was not honest by any stretch of the 
imagination.33 It would have been however been politically impossible to take a 
second election under the circumstances and for good or ill, the results stood as they 
were. 34 If the New Zealand government, or any other western government, had 
questioned or objected to the results of the first full election in South Africa or 
refused to accept the results, the outcome almost certainly would have been 
renewed conflicts between the third world states and the New Zealand government, 
with negative consequences for New Zealand abroad. The desire to move on from 
the long drawn out affair of apartheid was strong in the New Zealand government. 
If the price meant accepting one flawed election, then that was a price they were 
willing to pay. It seems that the New Zealand government may have been swept up 
in the euphoria of the South African election. That the election went ahead at all 
was a major achievement. Many had thought that this would never happen at all. It 
was a truly inspiring sight to see the long winding queues waiting peacefully in the 
sun. The atmosphere of jubilation, reconciliation, and the seeming lack of rancour, 
                                                   
33 R.W Johnson, “How Free? How Fair?” in Launching Democracy In South Africa: The 
First Open Election, April 1994 ed. R.W Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer, New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press 1996 p 323  
34 Giliomee, Afrikaners, pp. 646-647    
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was remarkable. 35   In New Zealand, the reaction was mostly one of relief and 
satisfaction that one of the twentieth century’s most contentious chapters had 
concluded. Parliament passed a resolution of approval and many breathed a sigh of 
relief that it was all over. Prior to Mandela’s inauguration as president, Bolger made 
a public statement that the 1981 Springbok tour had been a mistake and later 
apologised on behalf of the National party. 36     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
35 Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, pp. 226-239  
36 Templeton, Human Rights, p. 290  
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Conclusion 
 
The South African experience has gripped the attention of the world because it 
represented the result of ethnic, tribal and religious instincts being given 
tragically free reign. In South Africa, what many other countries fear could 
happen to them was actually played out for all to see. Many New Zealanders 
know in their hearts that had circumstances been different in this country we 
could have quite easily have gone down the same road ourselves. 
 
Chris Laidlaw, Rights of Passage, 1999  
 
“National Ideals or National Interests” has been an attempt to investigate 
the workings of policy making in a sphere of New Zealand’s foreign relations prone 
to rapid changes and heated public emotions. The process was a balance of the 
idealistic and the pragmatic. Interaction is paramount. Far from being straight 
forward, decisions were often the results of accident, personal agenda, or self-
fulfilling prophecies. More often than not, economic interests came first, but this 
did not mean that the ideals were lost in the process, merely placed on the back 
burner until circumstances would allow. The change in New Zealand foreign policy 
towards South Africa in the 1980s was as much a reaction to changes in New 
Zealand society as it was to third world hostility and the threat this hostility posed 
to both trade and multilateral efforts relating to the Nuclear-Free South Pacific 
campaign. Alienation of the third world states from New Zealand was not trivial; it 
was a very real threat to the country’s prosperity and potentially its security. The 
sporting controversies are the most well remembered facet of the period of New 
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Zealand –South Africa relations but they have to be seen in the broader context of 
attempts to induce successive New Zealand governments and opposition parties, 
Labour and National, to take a hard line on investment, trade and third party 
sanctions. Some groups and individuals also tried to lobby for the ban of 
immigration of white South Africans into New Zealand lest their 'racist' attitudes 
infect the rest of the population. It is ironic therefore that bilateral trade spiked 
following the imposition of sanctions and that immigration increased. It is also 
shows that while sanctions might send a strong note of disapproval, they are 
difficult to police and if individuals are sufficiently determined, can be 
circumvented.  
     In chapter one it was argued that the decision to allow the 1981 Springbok 
tour to go ahead was motivated by domestic politics, particularly Muldoon’s desire 
to secure the votes in the rural areas and the marginal suburbs. But it was the loss of 
the 1984 election, not the 1981 tour, which was the catalyst for change within the 
National Party on South Africa. Mild sanctions were imposed against UDI 
Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s, but little was done to enforce them. New 
Zealand’s policy makers in the early 1980s erroneously concluded that such an 
approach was at best of limited effectiveness. From the point of view of those 
affected in New Zealand sanctions were more trouble than they were worth. 
Rhodesia is not explicitly mentioned in the primary sources, but the linkage to 
South Africa on sanctions is common in the secondary sources. The conclusion can 
be drawn that the disappointment over the ‘failure’ of Rhodesian sanctions must 
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have been a tacit assumption in the minds of the majority of New Zealand policy 
makers in the period. There was an unwillingness to impose sanctions unless 
absolute necessity demanded it.  
The interlocked arguments of ‘kith and kin’ and anti-communism still held 
powerful attraction for National and for Muldoon. Following the 1981 tour, such 
logic was losing its attraction for many within the New Zealand government and 
among policy makers. Questions were raised within the National party about 
Muldoon’s strategy and leadership, and about the damage that was being done not 
just to the party’s image with the domestic electorate but also to New Zealand’s 
image abroad. But it is easy to exaggerate these doubts. The majority of New 
Zealand policy makers and politicians were still distrustful of the liberation parties 
and their ties to the communist bloc. There were no attempts to cut ties, and the 
approach of National to dealing with the fallout was that of ‘duck and weave’ to 
avoid further trouble.             
The main findings of chapter two were that the about face following the 
election of the Labour party in 1984 was as much about damage control as it was 
about the implementation of a ‘principled policy’. Popular memory may like to 
recall the Lange approach to foreign policy as ‘moral’ and patriotic, but this does 
not apply in a number of circumstances. Lange’s approach of rapprochement with 
black Africa and a stronger sanctions campaign was in the international context, a 
sensible move as the pendulum began to swing in favour of a more rigorous 
sanctions campaign. Policy towards South Africa also needs to be seen against the 
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backdrop of longer term broadening of New Zealand’s external relations in regions 
beyond Britain, Western Europe, and North America. Although it is trite to say so, 
the impact of the changing nature of New Zealand’s trade patterns had on the 
country’s foreign policy cannot be underestimated. Since the British market was 
becoming less accessible due to the increasing integration of the European 
Economic Community (later European Union), new markets needed to be sought 
and no stone could be left unturned, meaning even long shots like Africa needed to 
be explored along with surer bets like the Communist Bloc, Latin America and the 
Middle East. It is hard to say just how beneficial the newfound interest in Africa 
had been, as trade was not the primary goal of the bridge building exercise, 
although signs were positive. Lange’s tour of Africa and the opening of the Harare 
High Commission, both initiatives that were of interest to Lange, certainly helped 
to clarify where the New Zealand government stood on South Africa. This proved 
invaluable after the 1986 Cavaliers tour. The Labour government was often at odds 
with the protest movement, which was pressing for a more comprehensive 
programme of action against South Africa, like bans on travel and immigration. 
These were in fact unconstitutional and contrary to accepted definitions of New 
Zealand civil rights. The closure of the South African Consulate was another source 
of controversy for the New Zealand government. Its closure was an effective piece 
of political theatre as it gave the Labour government increased credibility to deal 
with the fallout of the 1986 Cavaliers tour. Another stroke of luck for Lange and 
New Zealand was that during the 1980s much of the international anger over 
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sporting contacts and investment was directed at Margaret Thatcher and Britain. 
This shift in focus allowed New Zealand to regroup without provoking excessive 
external criticism.    
Unlike the two National governments that bookend it, personalities take on 
a greater importance in the fourth Labour government, especially that of Lange 
himself who for the first term was both foreign minister and prime minister. 
Although he stamped his personality on the portfolio, overall, like Muldoon’s 
decision to hold the portfolios for prime minister and finance, his effectiveness was 
diminished by the intensive nature of both portfolios. Given his habit of 
exhaustively answering personally letters sent to him, Lange may have been 
hampered by too much trivia to take control of the bigger picture, a problem 
Michael Bassett makes clear in his memoir. Russell Marshall, as Foreign Minister, 
was able to give the portfolio the attention it needed.                 
Chapter three argued that it is likely that if the Nationalists in South Africa 
had not decided to negotiate with the liberation parties, then the New Zealand 
National Party would probably have maintained its established positions on South 
Africa. This move would not have been unanimously accepted, as there was support 
for the change of policy within the Party. The split was mainly generational but also 
geographical, with the older hard line supporters being focused mostly in rural 
electorates and the more liberal wing in the swing seats in the suburbs where the 
Party had to compete against Labour and the minor parties. The attempts to reach 
out to black Africa need to be seen in the broader context of the widening approach 
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to New Zealand foreign policy. Bolger, overall, was happy to follow the lead of the 
outgoing Labour government on Africa. Despite this, questions were raised over the 
viability and cost of the Harare High Commission. Returning to the older pattern of 
shying away from sanctions and allowing contacts to be maintained had been for 
the most part discredited. This approach was simply not politically feasible, even if 
it continued to enjoy support in some quarters. It was also very helpful that South 
Africa did not descend into a civil war as had been feared by many. 
New Zealand foreign policy in this period did not ‘do’ doctrines. None of 
the three governments in power in the years 1981-1994 had an overarching strategy 
about South Africa. That is not to say that these parties did not have plans that were 
based around the expedience of the immediate present and the individual party’s 
political philosophies. The popular perception of the actions of the New Zealand 
government in the years 1981-1994; that National was an active supporter of the 
Nationalists in South Africa and that Labour had been opponents and even ‘world 
leaders’ in the sanctions campaign, are not supported by the evidence and lack 
credibility. Domestic factors, such as dissatisfaction with the economy and the 
polarising nature of the Muldoon and Lange governments cannot be overlooked. 
That successive governments lacked consistent plans and policies, were subject to 
internal faction fighting and horse-trading with other parties, is undeniable. 
However, such controlled chaos was and is the norm in an open society, is a vital 
part of the democratic political system and not a sign of weakness or incompetence. 
The trick for the politicians is to make these elements work to their advantage, often 
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by judicious management of personalities and clever public relations to give the 
impression of a united front on such matters. Probably the most important, but often 
unarticulated, fact is that New Zealand in comparison with South Africa had a 
stronger tradition of civil society. This explains the reluctance of successive 
governments to impose direct sanctions and of the inability to persuade these 
groups to stop their contacts with South Africa. Governments in South Africa often 
made use of nominally independent bodies to pursue government policies and to 
provide patronage to its supporters. This kind of behaviour was for a great many in 
New Zealand inconceivable. It is for this reason the most meaningful opposition to 
contact with apartheid South Africa, sporting or otherwise came in the form of 
private protest lobbies such as HART, and not government action. Finnegan vs. 
NZRFU was a private suit in the civil courts, not a criminal prosecution under 
crown auspices. This approach, though, needs to be balanced against parochialism 
and unwillingness of groups like NZRFU to consider the impact maintaining 
contacts with South Africa would have on New Zealand’s reputation abroad.  
 For most of the twentieth century, it is important to remember that much of 
the world was under the rule of one colonial power or another. Following the 
Second World War, one by one, these former colonies became independent states. 
In reality, most of these new countries became clients or allies of the USA or 
USSR. Through weight of numbers, this disparate and often internally divided 
group of nations could be a powerful bloc in its own right and frequently found 
itself in the position of holding the balance of power in crucial decision-making. 
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This voting power was important in forums like the United Nations and to a lesser 
extent the Commonwealth. However, this power had its limits. The Americans, a 
few European states and other allies including New Zealand could stop motions in 
these global forums supported by the majority of its members, often by virtue of the 
United States’ veto in the UN Security Council. This growth of former colonial 
states in the world was a major factor in the international efforts to end apartheid. It 
was one of the few subjects in which smaller countries could claim influence 
beyond their size. This was as true of first world nations as of third world ones. 
This growing influence was part of the diplomatic efforts of most black African 
states against South Africa and later against New Zealand. International 
organisations, the equality of sovereign states and multilateralism have been, on 
paper at least, some of the most influential developments in post-war international 
relations. In practice, the traditional pattern of power rivalry and skulduggery often 
prevailed. Such behaviour was masked with courteous language and pious 
platitudes about fellowship of nations, liberty, and self-determination. Of course, 
this was to assume this was an outside problem to solve. Like most things in life, 
the South Africans had to solve this for themselves, and largely they did. For New 
Zealand, this meant that when a situation arose where these decolonised states were 
able to wield real influence, the threat of sanctions and of ostracism against New 
Zealand, the potential consequences were serious. The value in not alienating or 
offending these countries was a lesson that for New Zealand came almost too late.    
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